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The best way to predict the future is to invent it. 
 
Alan Kay 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
THE ADAPTIVE RELEVANCE OF PREDICTION ERRORS 
Throughout our lives we are shaped by our experiences and by the 
decisions we made in the past. Our prior experiences color how we view the 
world around us and direct where our curiosity will lead us next. Yet, we 
live our everyday life without realizing how our view of the world is shaped 
by the entirety of our accumulated experiences that keeps evolving over 
time. This is not only a semi-philosophical way of looking at our everyday 
lives; according to the predictive coding framework it is also a good 
description of how the brain works (Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Rao & Ballard, 
1999; Summerfield et al., 2006). Over time, we build up an understanding of 
the world that subsequently guides our perception and our actions.  
Each moment, the brain is tasked with processing a rich stream of 
(sensory) information and determining our next actions. Accomplishing this 
daunting task requires a large investment of energy. In order to function as 
efficiently as possible, the brain has therefore been hypothesized to construct 
an internal model of the world based on our previous experiences. This 
internal model allows us to infer what the future will look like. Next, the 
resulting predictions about the nearby future are cascaded down the 
processing hierarchy in the brain, e.g. from higher processing stages to the 
primary sensory cortex. There, the top-down predictions explain away most 
of the incoming (sensory) input. What remains to be processed is mainly 
limited to the unpredicted events. Thus, the brain can proactively anticipate 
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its (sensory) input before its actual occurrence, simplifying the processing 
requirements.  
The information that is not accounted for by the top-down predictions 
then enters the bottom-up processing stream. These bottom-up prediction 
errors (PEs) not only inform higher processing stages about the outside 
world, they also function as a teaching signal. Indeed, PEs signal a learning 
opportunity as the internal model was unable to predict the actual events and 
should be adjusted. Thus, by repeated adjustments based on the PE feedback, 
the brain learns and thereby optimizes its processing efficiency.  
Taken together, the predictive coding framework entails that on the 
short term top-down predictions steer perception. In addition, the bottom-up 
PEs serve as a teaching signal and hence result in learning on the long term. 
In the current dissertation we will explore both of these phenomena: the 
short term effect of PEs on perception and the long term effect of PEs on 
learning. However, before moving on to the specific research questions we 
first discuss our general research approach. 
Arguably, although the predictive coding framework mainly 
endeavors to characterize the fundamental principles and organization of the 
brain, it comes at the cost of limited specificity. In particular, it attempts to 
cover a wide variety of processes, encompassing the role of PEs on the scale 
of a single cortical column, as well as on the scale of a network that spans 
the entire cortex. Therefore, although the broad framework has been 
sketched, more specific mechanisms are needed to fill in how PEs guide 
perception and learning. 
Therefore, we aimed to explore more deeply how PEs determine 
perception and learning by using a systems approach (hence the subtitle of 
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this dissertation). In this systems approach, we drew upon formal models of 
how neural circuits perform a number of computations. In the first part of the 
dissertation, a formal model is applied to investigate how a perceptual 
decision can be influenced by prior information. In the second part, we 
formally quantified RPEs during a declarative learning task to probe their 
effect on learning. Below we will introduce both formal approaches 
separately and conclude with an overview of the dissertation outline. 
THE SHORT TERM EFFECT OF PES ON PERCEPTION 
We start by turning our attention toward the short term effect of PEs 
on perception. More specifically, we will investigate the effect of PEs on 
vision. Visual processing lends itself ideally for exploring the implications of 
the predictive coding framework. First, the visual processing areas and 
pathways belong to the most extensively studied structures in the brain. 
Also, the strong hierarchical organization of the visual processing stream is 
ideally fit to test the feedforward and feedback mechanisms described by the 
predictive coding framework. It therefore comes as no surprise that visual 
processing has been among the first empirical research lines established to 
test the effect of PEs on perception (Enns & Lleras, 2008; Rao & Ballard, 
1999; Summerfield et al., 2006). 
Exposure to prior information has long been known to influence 
subsequent perception. For example in priming studies, information that was 
presented subliminally (either through masking or by presenting it for only a 
few milliseconds) has been demonstrated to influence the reaction to 
subsequent stimuli (for a review, see Neely, 1991). Matching or related 
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stimuli are typically processed faster and more accurately. However, it is 
often difficult to differentiate between the impact of prior expectations on 
perception itself and the impact these prior expectations have on subsequent 
processing stages such as decision making and response execution. 
Interestingly, research on visual awareness has offered a number of 
paradigms that are specifically designed to focus on the earliest stages of 
visual processing. One of these paradigms of particular interest for 
examining the role of PEs on perception, is binocular rivalry (Clark, 2013; 
Dayan, 1998; Hohwy, Roepstorff, & Friston, 2008). As the name suggests, 
in this paradigm rivalry is created between both eyes by presenting each eye 
with a different picture. For example, a face could be shown to the right eye, 
whereas a house could be shown to the left eye. Instead of blending both 
pictures into one transparently overlaid image, perception alternates between 
the two pictures. Importantly, this bistable visual experience could be the 
result of the predictive mechanisms that try to explain away the conflicting 
input. When for instance the house is the dominant percept, a top-down 
prediction about the house is projected along the processing hierarchy 
toward the earliest processing stages. There, the top-down predictions 
explain away the perception of the house presented to the left eye. However, 
the face picture presented to the right eye will give rise to a bottom-up PE 
signal, accumulating over time. Once these accumulated PEs can no longer 
be ignored, the predictive mechanism switches to the face percept in an 
attempt to minimize PEs. Thus, the face becomes the dominant percept 
which is predicted in a top-down fashion, starting another cycle in the 
alternating perception sequence. 
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Taken together, these examples illustrate how research on visual 
awareness has already sparked a theoretical and empirical interest in the role 
of PEs in perception (Hohwy, 2012; Rauss, Schwartz, & Pourtois, 2011; 
Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2011). We will build upon this research in the 
current dissertation, but before we introduce the current research question we 
will first discuss the role of PEs in learning. 
Probing the effect of PEs on perception through the drift diffusion 
model 
In order to determine how PEs influence perception on the short term, 
we used a formal model from the decision making literature: the drift 
diffusion model (DDM; Bogacz, 2007; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff, 1985). This model is 
typically applied to a two-alternative forced choice task in which a (visually) 
presented stimulus must be assigned to one of two categories. Participants 
are requested to respond as fast and as accurate as possible. This instruction 
creates a speed-accuracy trade-off: either a decision is made quickly and thus 
with higher error likelihood or the participant alternatively chooses to 
increase accuracy but at the cost of a less speeded response. 
Based on behavioral choices and the response times of these choices, 
the DDM disentangles how speed and accuracy are weighed against each 
other. To illustrate the DDM in analogy to our previous example, suppose 
that the picture of a house or a face is presented and that participants are 
asked to categorize the picture accordingly. From the onset of the stimulus 
presentation (e.g., a house), evidence in favor of each option accumulates 
over time until a decision threshold is reached. When the accumulated 
evidence reaches the decision threshold for the detection of a house first, the 
 20     CHAPTER 1 
participant will correctly report seeing a house. Alternatively, if the evidence 
accumulation accidently reaches the threshold associated with the face first, 
the picture will incorrectly be categorized as a face. 
The DDM contains a number of parameters that detail how the speed-
accuracy trade-off can be solved in different ways. Generally speaking, a 
(perceptual) decision can be reached faster by either lowering the decision 
threshold or by increasing the accumulation speed (i.e., the processing 
efficiency). Each of these adjustments has a distinct influence on the 
response times for the correct and incorrect categorizations. Thus, the model 
enables us to infer the parameter settings based on merely the reaction times 
and behavioral choices. 
In previous research, the DDM has been used succesfully to 
differentiate under what circumstances perception is influenced by either 
altered processing efficiency or threshold setting (Mulder, Wagenmakers, 
Ratcliff, Boekel, & Forstmann, 2012; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014; 
Summerfield & Egner, 2009). Thus, we will use the DDM to probe whether 
PEs influence visual awareness by altering the threshold setting or by 
changing the processing efficiency. 
THE LONG TERM EFFECT OF PES ON LEARNING 
A second component of this dissertation is the long term effect of PEs 
on learning. Based on our internal model of the world, the brain learns by 
comparing the rewarding value of the outcome it predicted to the actual 
reward feedback provided by the environment. This reward feedback is not 
only evaluated on its predictability (i.e., the size of the reward prediction 
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error; RPE), but also on its valence (i.e., is the outcome more positive or 
negative than expected). In that sense, any experience can be categorized as 
being more rewarding (positive RPE) or less rewarding than expected 
(negative RPE). These positive and negative RPEs subsequently serve as a 
teaching signal to optimize the accuracy of future predictions. Hence, 
research on learning has not just focused on PEs, but more specifically on 
RPEs (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Sutton & Barto, 1998). 
RPEs are known to be signaled by the dopaminergic reward system, 
encompassing midbrain structures such as the substantia nigra and the 
ventral tegmental area (VTA; Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; Schultz, Dayan, & 
Montague, 1997). Dopaminergic cells in these structures respond to the 
difference between the expected and received reward. Each time an event 
proves to be more rewarding than anticipated a phasic dopamine burst is 
elicited, lasting about 200 to 500 milliseconds. These dopaminergic bursts 
evoked by RPEs subsequently trigger the activation of a dopaminergic 
pathway with projection ranging across a wide variety of brain regions such 
as the hippocampus, the frontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC).  
The notion that any event can be valued as rewarding or unrewarding 
is supported by neuroscientific evidence and computational models. Of 
particular importance in this regard is the reward value and prediction model 
(RVPM) put forward by Silvetti, Seurinck, and Verguts (2011). Centered on 
the involvement of the ACC in various functions such as error detection and 
value estimation, the RVPM model states that any event (e.g., any stimulus 
or action) has its own predicted value (Sutton & Barto, 1998). This reward 
value evolves over time as the value of an event is updated each time this 
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event occurs. Again, the difference between the predicted and actual value of 
the event (i.e., the RPE) functions as a teaching signal and results in an 
updated value associated with that event. 
RPEs influence behavior on the long term by shaping stable 
adaptations to the environment through various forms of learning (for a 
historical overview, see Squire, 2004). A long research tradition has focused 
on the influence of RPEs on procedural learning. Typically, these 
experiments reveal how RPEs gradually shape the acquisition of for instance 
stimulus-response associations. In this type of trial-by-trial learning, 
associations are formed by integrating across all previous encounters with 
the stimulus material and extracting which response is on average preferable. 
The associative strength between the stimulus and the response is weakened 
when the outcome is less beneficial than expected (a negative RPE) and is 
enhanced when the outcome is better than expected (a positive RPE).  
Aside from procedural learning, much of our knowledge is acquired 
through declarative learning. Both types of learning differ in a number of 
ways. First, declarative learning mainly involves the acquisition of stimulus-
stimulus associations. Thus, the type of information being learned typically 
involves facts and events. Second, declarative learning is usually very fast as 
knowledge can be acquired based on a single encounter. Lastly, whereas 
procedural knowledge is often difficult to describe verbally, declarative 
knowledge can be probed through explicit recall or reporting. Also, this 
allows the acquired information to be describing in relation to other 
knowledge. 
Interestingly, although the influence of RPEs on procedural learning is 
well established, the empirical evidence for the impact of RPEs on 
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declarative learning remains remarkably absent in the literature. Therefore, 
in the second part of this dissertation we set out to test whether RPEs indeed 
serve as a teaching signal in declarative learning. 
Probing the effect of PEs on learning through the neoHebbian learning 
account 
In order to examine the long term effect of RPEs on declarative 
learning, we combined the well-established role of RPEs in procedural 
learning with a recent framework on declarative learning. To start, we drew 
upon the reinforcement learning literature to quantify RPEs as the difference 
between the obtained reward and the expected reward (Bush & Mosteller, 
1951a, 1951b; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). This parametric quantification of 
RPEs is traditionally used as the teaching signal in procedural learning. 
Next, we combined these quantified RPEs with the recent neoHebbian 
learning framework put forward by Lisman, Grace, & Duzel (2011), 
detailing how RPEs can influence declarative learning.  
According to this neoHebbian account (Lisman et al., 2011), a large 
amount of information is temporarily stored by the hippocampus during 
initial memory encoding. However, not all of this information will be 
consolidated in long-term memory through long-term potentiation (LTP). 
Only those memory traces that were tagged as important during initial 
encoding will be engrained in long-term memory, a process that is known as 
the tagging and capture model (Frey & Morris, 1998). At the level of the 
individual synapses, a connection can be tagged as important by a concurrent 
dopamine burst. These tags have little influence on the strength of the 
synaptic connection on the short term. Instead, the tags trigger the synthesis 
of plasticity-related proteins through late LTP, thus strengthening the 
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synaptic connection on the long term. Notably, the tagging and capture 
model implies that the effect of dopamine bursts on memory performance 
will become more evident in a delayed memory test (e.g., after a week) 
compared to an immediate test (e.g., after twenty minutes). 
The neoHebbian learning framework thus asserts that dopamine plays 
a crucial role in the acquisition of declarative knowledge on the long term. 
Events that necessitate learning such as novelty, salience and reward give 
rise to dopamine-dependent tagging and thus determine what information 
will be stored through LTP and what will be forgotten (Lisman et al., 2011). 
As described previously, RPEs elicit such dopamine bursts in the substantia 
nigra and VTA, triggering a dopaminergic pathway with projections to the 
hippocampal area. Thus, RPEs are hypothesized to tag the information that is 
being encoded in the hippocampus at that time, resulting in enhanced 
declarative learning. 
In sum, we will calculate RPEs based on the reinforcement learning 
quantification and test whether this teaching signal predicts long term 
declarative learning, as described by the neoHebbian learning framework. 
OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
In chapter 2, we will use the DDM to investigate how PEs influence 
perception. More specifically, the brief presentation of a house or face 
picture will be cued with either an icon that correctly predicts the identity of 
the picture (congruent trials), an icon that predicts the alternative picture 
(incongruent or PE trials) or an icon that gives no prior information (neutral 
trials). In contrast to previous studies, participants were not asked to 
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categorize the stimulus based on its identity (i.e., identification task); instead 
they indicated whether the picture was presented above or below fixation 
(i.e., individuation task). Thus, although the cue was informative about the 
identity of the upcoming picture, it was not predictive for the correct 
response in the individuation task. This allowed us to exclude a bias toward 
a specific motor response. Applying the DDM we compared the parameter 
estimates for the congruent, incongruent and neutral trials in order to test 
whether PEs (incongruent trials) influenced visual processing by modulating 
the processing efficiency parameter or the threshold setting parameter. 
In chapter 3, we turn our attention toward the effect of RPEs on 
declarative learning. During a declarative learning task, we parametrically 
manipulated the RPEs that participants experienced during the encoding of 
word pairs. Next, we tested declarative memory in a recognition task that 
was performed either immediately (i.e., after a brief filler task) or after a 
one-day delay. In our analysis, we probed how positive and negative RPEs 
influence declarative memory on the short term (immediate test) and on the 
long term (delayed test). In addition, we excluded alternative interpretations 
of the results such as the time-on-task. 
In chapter 4, we built upon the behavioral paradigm used in chapter 3 
to further explore whether RPEs have a direct influence on declarative 
learning or whether this influence is mediated by attentional modulations. In 
order to do so, the behavioral task was adapted to an electroencephalography 
(EEG) design suited for a time-frequency analysis. This allowed us to 
measure the oscillatory power in several frequency bands. Furthermore, we 
extracted these power estimates on a trial-by-trial basis. This approach 
allowed us to verify whether our quantification of the RPEs matches how 
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participants experience these teaching signals, by testing whether RPEs were 
reflected in the oscillatory power estimates during reward feedback. Next, 
we probed whether these RPE signatures directly predicted the enhancement 
of declarative learning, or whether they improved learning indirectly (e.g., 
through increased attention during encoding). 
Finally, in the general discussion, we will evaluate the implications 
of our findings for the literature on perception and learning. Also, we will 
discuss future perspectives on how our approach could further our current 
understanding of the influence of PEs on perception and learning. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
PREDICTIVE INFORMATION SPEEDS UP VISUAL 
AWARENESS IN AN INDIVIDUATION TASK BY 
MODULATING THRESHOLD SETTING, NOT PROCESSING 
EFFICIENCY
1
 
Theories on visual awareness claim that predicted stimuli reach awareness 
faster than unpredicted ones. In the current study, we disentangle whether prior 
information about the upcoming stimulus affects visual awareness of stimulus 
location (i.e., individuation) by modulating processing efficiency or threshold 
setting. Analogous research on stimulus identification revealed that prior 
information modulates threshold setting. However, as identification and 
individuation are two functionally and neurally distinct processes, the 
mechanisms underlying identification cannot simply be extrapolated directly to 
individuation. The goal of this study was therefore to investigate how 
individuation is influenced by prior information about the upcoming stimulus. 
To do so, a drift diffusion model was fitted to estimate the processing efficiency 
and threshold setting for predicted versus unpredicted stimuli in a cued 
individuation paradigm. Participants were asked to locate a picture, following 
a cue that was congruent, incongruent or neutral with respect to the picture’s 
identity. Pictures were individuated faster in the congruent and neutral 
condition compared to the incongruent condition. In the diffusion model 
analysis, the processing efficiency was not significantly different across 
conditions. However, the threshold setting was significantly higher following an 
incongruent cue compared to both congruent and neutral cues. Our results 
indicate that predictive information about the upcoming stimulus influences 
visual awareness by shifting the threshold for individuation rather than by 
enhancing processing efficiency. 
                                                     
1
 De Loof, E., Van Opstal, F., & Verguts, T. (2016). Predictive information speeds up 
visual awareness in an individuation task by modulating threshold setting, not 
processing efficiency. Vision Research, 121, 104–112. doi:10.1016/j.visres.2016.03.002 
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INTRODUCTION 
Driving through an unfamiliar city, looking for the colleagues you 
promised to pick up, you might face a challenging visual perception task. 
Luckily, having some prior (i.e., predictive) knowledge about what your 
colleagues look like will facilitate becoming aware of them. Indeed, several 
consciousness theories have proposed mechanisms by which prior information 
modulates visual awareness. For example, according to Clark (2013) prior 
information is one of the key aspects to determine which stimuli reach visual 
awareness and at what speed. While the effect of prior information on visual 
perception has already been investigated extensively in paradigms that require 
stimulus identification, it remains unclear how it influences the distinct visual 
process of stimulus individuation (i.e., the spatial tagging of an object in a 
visual scene). The current study investigates whether and how prior information 
influences visual awareness in individuation. 
The influence of prior information on visual perception has typically been 
investigated in paradigms that require the identification of visual input. In these 
experiments, participants need to categorize a degraded or masked stimulus 
(e.g., distinguishing a face from a house picture masked by noise). Predicted 
stimuli are typically perceived faster and more accurately. In order to gain more 
insight into the modulations of identification by prior information, formal 
models such as the drift diffusion model (DDM) and signal detection theory 
(SDT) have been used to disentangle the underlying mechanisms (for a review, 
see Mulder, van Maanen, & Forstmann, 2014; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). 
In the DDM (see Figure 1; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998), evidence is accumulated 
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at a certain rate (i.e., drift rate) from a starting point toward an upper or lower 
criterion bound. The distance between the upper and lower bounds is called 
boundary separation. The total response time is the sum of this evidence 
accumulation time plus any cognitive processes preceding or following the 
decision process (i.e., non-decision time). Critically, the parameters of the 
decision process (e.g., drift rate, boundary separation and starting point) can be 
mapped onto distinct mechanisms by which expectations can influence the 
accumulation process. First, prior information can improve visual processing 
efficiency. This is reflected in increased drift rate (see Figure 1a). Second, prior 
information can reduce the required amount of accumulated information. This is 
reflected by the distance between the starting point and decision boundaries 
henceforth referred to as threshold setting (see Figure 1b). Importantly, 
threshold setting encompasses both starting point placement and boundary 
separation, although only the latter is relevant in the current experimental 
paradigm (see below). 
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a. Processing efficiency 
 
b. Threshold setting 
 
Figure 1: Prior information can influence visual perception by modulating processing 
efficiency (panel a) or threshold setting (panel b), respectively mapped onto the DDM 
parameters drift rate and boundary separation. The DDM is depicted including the non-
decision time and starting point parameter. Hypothetical reaction time (RT) 
distributions for the correct and error responses are plotted at the corresponding upper 
and lower boundary. Increased processing efficiency and more lenient boundaries are 
indicated in blue, while decreased processing efficiency and more conservative 
boundary settings are depicted in orange. 
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Using these and related formal models, a number of studies have 
investigated how prior information influences stimulus identification. By 
manipulating the predictability of a shape in a shape discrimination task, 
Domenech and Dreher (2010) found using the LATER model (Reddi & 
Carpenter, 2000) that prior information influences threshold setting rather than 
processing efficiency. A cue predicting the movement direction in a random-dot 
motion paradigm influenced threshold setting but not processing efficiency 
(using the DDM: Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, & Forstmann, 2012; 
using a linear ballistic accumulator model: Forstmann, Brown, Dutilh, 
Neumann, & Wagenmakers, 2010). Using the DDM, Dunovan, Tremel, and 
Wheeler (2014) found that the identification of a house or face masked by noise 
was influenced by a house or face cue through the modulation of threshold 
setting. Interestingly, this modulation increased with the reliability of the cue 
(50, 70 or 90% accuracy) establishing a clear causal link between prior 
information and threshold setting. By contrast, using SDT Lupyan and Ward 
(2013) showed that cueing the word ‘circle’ or ‘square’ in a shape 
discrimination paradigm modulated processing efficiency (i.e., d’) but not 
threshold setting (i.e., response criterion).  
The results from these identification paradigms suggest that prior 
information influences visual awareness by modulating threshold setting. 
However, visual awareness studies usually require participants to report whether 
any item was perceived, irrespective of its identity (Baars, 1994; Overgaard & 
Sandberg, 2012; Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010; 
Sergent & Dehaene, 2004; Tononi & Koch, 2008). Interestingly, participants 
can often report where something was seen without knowing what was 
presented (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). Similarly, to corroborate awareness 
reports, participants are commonly asked to report the location of a stimulus 
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(i.e., individuation) rather than its identity (e.g., Yang & Blake, 2012). 
Therefore, to investigate how prior information influences visual awareness, it 
is critical to probe its effect on stimulus individuation. According to the 
individuation-identification theory (Leslie, Xu, Tremoulet, & Scholl, 1998), the 
number of objects in a scene (i.e., individuation) and object identity are 
determined in two separate processes. This idea resonates with theories 
claiming that spatial information plays a unique role in visual processing, 
separate from the identification process (Sagi & Julesz, 1984). This notion is 
also supported in object file theory (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992), 
where an object file is created based on spatial and temporal information, while 
its content is determined separately. As the individuation and identification 
stage are functionally and neurally different (Xu, 2009), prior information may 
influence perception via different mechanisms in these two visual processes. 
Indirect evidence for distinct mechanisms underlying stimulus 
identification and individuation comes from the spatial attention literature. First, 
while object-based attention (crucial for identification) is associated with the 
ventral processing stream, location-based attention (crucial for individuation) 
depends on the dorsal processing stream (Arrington, Carr, Mayer, & Rao, 2000; 
Chen, 2009; Chou, Yeh, & Chen, 2014). Second, in stark contrast to the 
modulation of threshold setting presented above, prior information about the 
location of the upcoming stimulus has been argued to enhance stimulus 
identification by increasing processing efficiency (Anton-Erxleben, Abrams, & 
Carrasco, 2010; Smith, Ratcliff, & Wolfgang, 2004; however, for an alternative 
interpretation see Schneider, 2011). So in similar identification paradigms, 
location cueing boosts processing efficiency while identity cueing modulates 
threshold setting. It could be argued that  as locating a stimulus is crucial to 
individuation  location cueing boosted processing efficiency in the 
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individuation process and not in the identification process. However, this 
interpretation of the results remains to be tested as an identification task was 
used rather than an individuation task. 
To investigate how prior information affects visual awareness of stimulus 
location in an individuation paradigm, we developed a cued masking task 
analogous to the identification studies described above. The picture of a house 
or a face (i.e., the target) was briefly presented above or below fixation, 
followed by a masking stimulus. Prior to the target presentation, participants 
were presented with a house or face cue that predicted the target identity with 
80% accuracy, or with a cue that provided no prior information (a question 
mark). This manipulation generated three trial types: congruent, incongruent 
and neutral trials. Participants responded as fast and as accurate as possible to 
the location and not to the identity of the target picture by pressing an upper or 
lower response button. The visibility of the target picture was tailored to the 
individuation threshold of the individual participants in a staircase procedure. 
Furthermore, as the identity cues informed on target identity but were 
orthogonal to the target location that participants responded to, no motor 
response could be primed by the cue. Therefore, the starting point was restricted 
to be half the boundary separation. A DDM was fitted to compare drift rate and 
boundary separation estimates across the three trial types (i.e., congruent, 
incongruent and neutral trials), revealing how prior information influences 
individuation by modulating the processing efficiency (drift rate) or the 
threshold setting (boundary separation). 
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METHOD 
Participants 
Twenty Ghent University students were paid 20 euro for taking part in the 
current experiment combined with another experiment. The order of the 
experiments was counterbalanced across subjects and spread across two days. 
The experiment order and the results of the other experiment did not interact 
with the current experiment and will not be discussed further. The experiment 
lasted approximately one hour. All participants (5 male; on average 19 years old 
with a range of 18 to 25) had normal or corrected to normal vision. Prior to the 
experiment they gave their informed consent in accordance with the Code of 
Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki) and received 
a debriefing form afterwards. 
Stimuli and material 
The stimulus set consisted of ten pictures of Caucasian faces from the 
Face Database of the Park Aging Mind Laboratory (5 males, age raging from 19 
to 79; Minear & Park, 2004) and ten pictures of houses taken from the Scene 
Understanding Database from the Princeton Vision Group (Xiao, Hays, 
Ehinger, Oliva, & Torralba, 2010). The face, house and question mark cue were 
taken from the website of The Noun Project (www.thenounproject.com; Person 
designed by Alex Fuller, House designed by OCHA Visual Information Unit, 
Question designed by Vicons Design). Scrambled versions of the pictures were 
constructed by dividing the picture in a 7  7 grid and randomizing the location 
of its 49 cells. All pictures and cues were luminance scaled to the average 
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luminance of all stimuli (mean HSV luminance of 0.62; mean Michelson 
contrast of 0.97) to avoid additional luminance-based variation in RTs. 
The experiment was run on a DELL Latitude E6430 laptop running 
Windows 7 Professional and an external DELL E2213 screen with a 1680 by 
1050 resolution. The refresh rate of the screen was set to 60 Hz. The stimulus 
presentation was programmed in MATLAB 2013a (Mathworks Inc.) with a 
Psychtoolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Answers were registered 
through a Cedrus RB-730 response box enhanced with four time-accurate push 
buttons (Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, California). Participants were seated at 
approximately 60 cm from the screen. The display extended over a 41  28 
visual angle black background. 
Procedure and design 
Each trial started with the presentation of the cue (house, face or question 
mark; 3.8  3.8 visual angle) for two seconds (see Figure 2a). Next, a full and 
a scrambled version of a picture (the targets; 10.5 x 10.5 visual angle) were 
presented for 33 ms at opposite sides of the cue (above and below; note that the 
locations of the cue and pictures show no overlap). Another scrambled version 
of the same picture (the mask) was subsequently presented at both sides of the 
cue for 33 ms. Next, an empty display was presented until a response was given. 
Participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible by pressing the button 
that matched the location of the full picture. Their right index and middle finger 
were positioned in corresponding positions on the response box. The trial ended 
with the feedback message ‘correct’ or ‘wrong’ presented for one second. 
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a. Trial design 
 
b. Experimental design 
 
Figure 2: Trial design (panel a) and experimental design (panel b) of the experiment. At 
the start of the trial a cue (the icon of a face, house or question mark) is presented for 
two seconds. Next a full picture and a scrambled version are shown as targets (33 ms), 
and subsequently masked by another scrambled version (33 ms). An empty display is 
presented until a response is given, followed by accuracy feedback (1000 ms). The three 
possible cues can be followed by a picture of a house or a face. The combinations of the 
cues and target pictures results in three trial types: neutral, congruent and incongruent 
trials. The number of trials is indicated for each cell of the design. 
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The experiment started with a practice phase of 60 trials, consisting of 20 
neutral and 40 congruent trials. The remaining 600 trials consisted of 200 
neutral trials and 400 trials with an informative cue (see Figure 2b). Of the 400 
informative cue trials, 80% were congruent trials (320 trials) and 20% were 
incongruent trials (80 trials). There were an equal number of house and face 
pictures in the congruent, incongruent and neutral trials. The incongruent trials 
were randomly dispersed across the experiment with the restriction that two 
incongruent trials were always separated by at least two congruent or neutral 
trials. The position of the full picture on the screen (top versus bottom) was 
randomized across all trial types (congruent, incongruent and neutral trials) and 
picture types (house versus face). Participants were informed that the neutral 
cues had no predictive value, and that house and face cues would correctly 
predict the picture type in 80% of the trials. 
Accuracy staircase procedure 
In order to acquire sufficient error trials for the DDM analysis, the 
visibility of the target pictures was varied in a staircase procedure such that 
participants localized the full picture incorrectly in 30% of the trials. The 
visibility was manipulated on a trial-to-trial basis by varying the luminance of 
the pictures from 0% (not visible) to 100% (fully visible). If errors remained 
above 30% when the target pictures were at maximum luminance, the 
luminance of the masks would subsequently be lowered from 100% to 0%. The 
luminance of the target pictures and masks started at 50% and 100% 
respectively. The practice phase allowed the staircase procedure to reach a 
stable plateau at 30% errors. The staircase procedure was further applied 
throughout the experiment to sustain the 30% error rate (Busch & VanRullen, 
2010; Gilzenrat, Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & Cohen, 2010). 
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A separate staircase was applied to the house and face picture trials. On 
each trial the average accuracy was calculated for the preceding ten house trials 
or ten face trials. When less than seven out of ten houses (faces) were 
individuated correctly, the luminance on the house (face) trials was increased 
with one percent. The luminance decreased with one percent when more than 
seven out of ten individuations were correct. To avoid unnecessary fluctuations 
in the staircase procedure, the less frequent incongruent trials were not taken 
into account for calculating this average accuracy. However, the luminance was 
adjusted on all trials, irrespective of the trial type (congruent, incongruent and 
neutral trials).  
Drift diffusion model 
The DDM parameters were estimated using the DMAT toolbox 
(Vandekerckhove & Tuerlinckx, 2007) running on MATLAB 2013a. The 
DMAT toolbox allows the estimation of seven parameters (see Figure 1) on a 
participant level: drift rate, boundary separation, starting point, non-decision 
time, drift rate variability, starting point variability, and non-decision time 
variability. The two parameters of interest (drift rate and boundary separation) 
were estimated separately for the three trial types (congruent, incongruent and 
neutral trials). In contrast to earlier work (Dunovan et al., 2014; Mulder et al., 
2012) the cue only informed participants about the identity of the upcoming 
stimulus. It did not inform on the to-be-reported location. Therefore, the starting 
point was restricted to half the boundary separation estimates as the cue (or 
indeed any other information) is unable to bias the starting point toward one or 
the other boundary when judging the stimulus location. All other parameters 
(the non-decision time and the three variability parameters) were estimated but 
not allowed to vary across trial types. The estimation method was set to 
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multinomial likelihood estimation based on percentiles with four percentile bins 
separated at the 20
th
, 50
th
 and 80
th
 percentile. The model was fitted for each 
participant individually, resulting in one drift rate and boundary separation 
estimate per trial type per participant. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
The staircase procedure was successfully applied in all 20 participants. 
The average number of incorrectly individuated full pictures per participant 
ranged from 30% to 39% for the houses (mean = 33%, sd = 2.1%) and from 
28% to 34% for the faces (mean = 29%, sd = 1.3%). 
Trials on which the interval between target pictures and masks exceeded 
33 ms due to software slowing were excluded (0.12% of the trials removed 
because interval lasted for 48 ms). RTs in the individuation task were subjected 
to a lower cutoff of 200 ms and an upper cutoff of 4000 ms (0.09% and 0.06% 
of the trials removed respectively). The average RTs per participant ranged 
from 458 ms to 1266 ms (mean average = 695 ms). The remaining data were 
entered into the DDM and accuracy analysis; the RT analysis was performed 
separately for the correct and error trials.  
Accuracy and RT analysis 
Accuracies were entered into a generalized linear mixed effects model 
with a random intercept across participants and the trial type as a fixed effects 
predictor. There was no significant main effect of trial type, 2(2, N = 20) = 
1.03, p = 0.60 (see Figure 3a). 
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The RTs for the correct and error trials were entered into a separate linear 
mixed effects model with a random intercept across participants and the trial 
type as a fixed effects predictor. For the correct RTs, trial type was a significant 
predictor (average RT for correct congruent, incongruent and neutral trials was 
670 ms, 724 ms and 676 ms respectively; 2(2, N = 20) = 42.3, p < 0.001; see 
Figure 3b). Follow-up tests revealed that the RTs on the incongruent trials were 
significantly slower compared to the congruent and neutral trials (respectively 
2(1, N = 20) = 40.9, p < 0.001, and 2(1, N = 20) = 27.5, p < 0.001). There was 
no significant difference in RTs between the congruent and neutral trials, 2(1, 
N = 20) = 1.10, p = 0.29. 
The trial type also significantly predicted the RTs on the error trials 
(average RT for error congruent, incongruent and neutral trials was 733 ms, 764 
ms and 717 ms respectively; 2(2, N = 20) = 11.0, p = 0.0040; see Figure 3c). 
Again, the RTs on the incongruent trials were higher compared to the congruent 
and neutral trials (respectively 2(1, N = 20) = 5.22, p = 0.022, and 2(1, N = 
20) = 11.3, p < 0.001), with no significant difference between congruent and 
neutral trials, 2(1, N = 20) = 2.51, p = 0.11. 
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  a. Accuracy: all trials 
 
  b. RT: correct trials          c. RT: error trials 
 
Figure 3: Accuracy (panel a) and RT analysis (panels b and c). The average accuracies 
and RTs are plotted with their 95% confidence intervals for all three trial types: 
congruent (blue), incongruent (orange) and neutral (gray) trials. The analysis revealed 
no significant effect of trial type on accuracy (p = 0.60). By contrast, RTs were 
significantly predicted by trial type on the correct trials (panel b; p < 0.001) and the 
error trials (panel c; p = 0.0040). Follow-up tests indicated that the RTs were higher on 
incongruent trials compared to neutral and congruent trials (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** 
p < 0.001). 
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DDM analysis 
The drift rate and boundary separation estimates were entered into 
separate linear mixed effects models with a random intercept across participants 
and the trial type as a fixed effects predictor. There was no significant 
difference between the drift rate estimates across trial types, 2(2, N = 20) = 
3.08, p = 0.21 (see Figure 4a). Conversely, the boundary separation estimates 
were predicted significantly by the trial type, 2(2, N = 20) = 27.2, p < 0.001 
(see Figure 4b). Follow-up tests revealed an increased boundary separation in 
incongruent trials compared to neutral trials, 2(1, N = 20) = 12.14, p < 0.001, 
and congruent trials, 2(1, N = 20) = 18.79, p < 0.001. The boundary separation 
was not significantly different for the neutral and congruent trials, 2(1, N = 20) 
= 0.068, p = 0.79. 
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  a. Drift rate comparison   b. Boundary separation comparison 
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Figure 4: The drift rate estimates (panel a) and boundary separation estimates (panel b) 
are compared across the three trial types (congruent (blue), incongruent (orange) and 
neutral (gray) trials), with each point representing a participant. The analysis revealed 
no significant difference between the drift rate estimates (p = 0.21) but a significantly 
higher boundary separation for incongruent trials compared to congruent and neutral 
trials (all p < 0.01). 
Four validation tests were performed to assess the overall quality of our 
DDM implementation. First, a quantile probability plot (see Figure 5) 
demonstrates a good fit between the observed data and the data simulated by 
our model, with only in the highest quantile a (typical) overestimation of the 
RTs (Leite & Ratcliff, 2011). Second, a bottom-up model building approach 
was used to test whether the model fit of a null model with no condition-
specific parameter estimates (model 1; M1) would significantly benefit from 
adding a condition-specific estimate for the drift rate (M2), boundary separation 
(M3) or non-decision time parameter (M4). For each participant separately, all 
four models were fitted and the deviances of models M2 to M4 were subtracted 
from the deviance of the null model M1, resulting in a chi-square value with the 
difference between the number of estimated parameters as the degrees of 
freedom. A chi-square test across participants revealed that the model fit of M1 
was significantly improved by adding condition-specific boundary separation 
(M3) and non-decision time estimates (M4), but not by adding a condition-
specific drift rate (M2; see Table 1). Next, we tested whether model M3 could 
be significantly improved by adding a condition-specific drift rate (M5; the 
model reported in detail above) or non-decision time estimate (M6). Statistical 
tests revealed no significantly improved model fits (see Table 1). Importantly, 
in model M6 the non-decision time estimates were not significantly different 
across conditions, 2(2, N = 20) = 0.17, p = 0.92, while there was a significant 
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difference between boundary separation estimates, 2(2, N = 20) = 15.4, p < 
0.001, with a higher boundary separation for the incongruent trials compared to 
congruent trials, 2(2, N = 20) = 7.81, p = 0.0052, and neutral trials, 2(2, N = 
20) = 8.86, p = 0.0029, but no difference between congruent and neutral trials, 
2(2, N = 20) = 0.20, p = 0.66. Thus, the bottom-up model building approach 
confirmed the results from the main DDM implementation: Only the boundary 
separation varies significantly across conditions. As a third validation test, the 
main model was fitted separately for the trials with house and face pictures to 
control for stimulus-specific effects or artifacts caused by the separate staircase 
procedure for house and face trials. Both models confirmed our main 
conclusion. Indeed, boundary separation estimates were higher for the 
incongruent trials compared to the neutral and congruent trials (all p < 0.001), 
while the trial type failed to significantly predict drift rate estimates. The fourth 
and final validation test considered that the estimation could be biased by the 
unbalanced design (320, 80 and 200 trials in the congruent, incongruent and 
neutral condition respectively). In a bootstrapping approach, an equal number of 
trials per picture type and trial type were randomly selected to fit the model and 
this procedure was repeated fifty times. The drift rate and boundary separation 
estimates per participant and trial type were subsequently entered in the linear 
mixed effects model with a random intercept across participants and the trial 
type as a fixed effects predictor. Confirming the results from the main model, 
there was no significant difference between the drift rate estimates, 2(2, N = 
20) = 2.47, p = 0.29, while the boundary separation estimates were significantly 
different, 2(2, N = 20) = 15.95, p < 0.001, with higher estimates in the 
incongruent trials compared to the neutral trials, 2(1, N = 20) = 10.7, p = 
0.0011, and congruent trials, 2(1, N = 20) = 15.4, p < 0.001. In sum, our 
validation tests demonstrate the quality of the model, and exclude a distortion of 
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the results due to the specific parameter restrictions, stimulus material, the 
staircase procedure or the unbalanced design. 
Table 1: Model comparisons 
M1: null ↔  M2: drift rate  2 (40, N = 20) = 35.7, p = 0.66 
 ↔  M3: boundary 2 (40, N = 20) = 82.9, p < 0.001 
 ↔  M4: non-decision time 2 (40, N = 20) = 80.1, p < 0.001 
M3: boundary ↔  M5: boundary + drift rate 2 (40, N = 20) = 41.8, p = 0.39 
 ↔  M6: boundary + non-decision time 2 (40, N = 20) = 42.8, p = 0.35 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The quantile probability plot for the DDM analysis is plotted for the observed 
(full lines) and simulated data (dashed lines). The average RTs across participants (y-
axis) are plotted separately for error/correct trials in the incongruent (blue), congruent 
(orange) and neutral condition (gray), divided in 5 quantiles. 
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DISCUSSION 
In a cued individuation paradigm we investigated how visual awareness 
of location is affected by prior information. The results show that prior 
information had no impact on the individuation accuracy, but it was highly 
predictive for the RTs: Stimuli following incongruent cues were individuated 
slower compared to stimuli following congruent or neutral cues. A drift 
diffusion analysis revealed that prior information modulates visual awareness 
by shifting threshold setting (implemented as boundary separation) and not by 
the modulation of processing efficiency (i.e., drift rate). Thus, when a stimulus 
is unexpected more evidence needs to be accumulated before the threshold for 
individuation is reached. 
The current study is to our knowledge the first to investigate whether and 
how prior information modulates performance in an individuation task, the 
typical measure for visual awareness (Baars, 1994; Sergent & Dehaene, 2004; 
for implementations see e.g. research using the continuous flash suppression 
technique based on Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). This is highly relevant as prior 
information is hypothesized to be one of the key elements that determine which 
input enters awareness and how fast (Enns & Lleras, 2008; Hohwy, Roepstorff, 
& Friston, 2008; Kouider, de Gardelle, Sackur, & Dupoux, 2010). The idea that 
prior information plays a pivotal role in the transition from unconscious 
processing to conscious perception has inspired a number of models on sensory 
awareness and visual awareness more specifically (Grossberg, 1999; King & 
Dehaene, 2014; Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2011; Thilakarathne, 2015). In 
addition, it has spurred multiple lines of empirical research. For example, our 
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actions and their sensory effects  whether visual, auditory or proprioceptive  
are highly predictable. Research in this domain has produced valuable insights 
on how the predictability of proprioceptive and visual input produced by our 
own actions alters awareness, especially when the input is ambiguous (Desantis, 
Hughes, & Waszak, 2012; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Salomon, Lim, Herbelin, 
Hesselmann, & Blanke, 2013; Stenner et al., 2014). In the current study we add 
to this literature by demonstrating by what mechanism prior information 
influences individuation, namely threshold setting. 
The modulation of threshold setting in the current individuation task 
parallels the mechanism by which prior information about the upcoming 
stimulus influences stimulus identification (Domenech & Dreher, 2010; 
Dunovan et al., 2014; Forstmann et al., 2010; Mulder et al., 2012). Importantly, 
the modulation of threshold setting by identity cueing is measured differently 
when fitting a DDM to identification or individuation paradigms. Depending on 
the paradigm, identity cues can alter the required amount of evidence 
accumulation by influencing either the boundary separation or the starting point 
parameter (both contributing to the threshold setting; see our discussion on 
Figure 1). In the identification paradigm, the identity cue is directly relevant for 
(correlated with) the response options, leading to response priming. In that case, 
the boundary separation remains fixed and the starting point can be positioned 
closer to the boundary associated with the predicted identity response (Dunovan 
et al., 2014; Mulder et al., 2012). Conversely, in the current identification 
paradigm the cue is unrelated to the response options, causing no response 
priming. In this case, the starting point cannot be biased toward one boundary or 
the other. Instead, the required amount of evidence can be raised by increasing 
the boundary separation symmetrically. Thus, unlike in identification 
paradigms, we can exclude the possibility that the observed difference in 
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threshold setting reflects response priming. However, note that by excluding 
response priming we do not claim that the identity cue had no influence on the 
response mechanisms involved in the decision process (Schneider, 2011); 
threshold setting is part of the response mechanism. 
As discussed in the introduction, the question how prior information 
influences visual awareness has also been tackled by using location cueing, 
however still within identification paradigms (Anton-Erxleben et al., 2010; 
Smith et al., 2004). Information at cued spatial locations is identified faster and 
this effect is ascribed to the overlap between the frontoparietal network 
supporting visual awareness and the parietal orienting system (for a review see 
Chica & Bartolomeo, 2012). As individuation and location cueing are both 
embedded in the dorsal processing stream, we could have investigated how 
identification is influenced by location cueing rather than identity cueing. 
However, as consciousness theories mainly focus on how visual awareness is 
affected by prior information about the identity of an upcoming stimulus rather 
than prior information about its location (Clark, 2013), we applied identity 
cueing to the individuation task. It would be interesting to apply a formal model 
(e.g., DDM) to disentangle whether location cueing in an individuation 
paradigm would boost processing efficiency as in the identification paradigms 
(Anton-Erxleben et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2004) or threshold setting as in the 
current individuation paradigm. Using SDT, Chica et al. (2011) already 
demonstrated that location cueing mainly influences processing efficiency (i.e., 
d’). However, also some effects on threshold setting (i.e., response criterion) 
were observed. Using DDM, future research could expound upon these results 
by clarifying under what conditions location cueing can influence threshold 
setting in individuation paradigms. 
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Now that we have identified threshold setting as crucial in individuation, 
we can speculate about its neural basis. Whereas drift rate is associated with 
processing efficiency mechanisms such as neural gain and the tuning of 
response curves (Isaacson & Scanziani, 2011; Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012; 
Liu, Larsson, & Carrasco, 2007; Martinez-Trujillo & Treue, 2004), shifts in 
threshold setting have been linked to altered baseline activation in regions 
coding for the predicted stimulus feature (Giesbrecht, Weissman, Woldorff, & 
Mangun, 2006; Langner et al., 2011; Macaluso, Eimer, Frith, & Driver, 2003). 
In the current study, face and house cues might trigger increased baseline 
activity in respectively the fusiform face area (FFA) and the parahippocampal 
place area (PPA). We propose that this boosted activity in relevant cortical areas 
will facilitate resonance with the parietal individuation areas (for a similar 
influence of stimulus-driven ventral processes on dorsal processes, see 
Macaluso & Doricchi, 2013). Correspondingly, Summerfield and colleagues 
demonstrated how increased baseline activation in FFA can cause a house to be 
misperceived as a face, activating the frontoparietal network for awareness 
(Summerfield, Egner, Mangels, & Hirsch, 2006). Functionally, this would lead 
to a lower threshold in the individuation process. Similarly, in our analysis 
lower thresholds were observed for the congruent trials compared to the 
incongruent trials, which would lead to faster but more error-prone stimulus 
individuation on congruent trials. Although no significant difference in error 
rate was found in the current paradigm higher error rates on congruent trials are 
possible. The latter could occur because the (task-irrelevant) target identity is 
quickly processed in the congruent condition, with the (task-relevant) target 
location processing lagging behind, potentially resulting in premature and 
incorrect localization responses. The exact neural basis of such a process 
remains to be studied. Interestingly, our study and those outlined above lay out 
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the empirical restrictions necessary for constructing more detailed neural 
models on how prior information influences visual awareness. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
SIGNED REWARD PREDICTION ERRORS DRIVE 
DECLARATIVE LEARNING 
1
 
Reward prediction errors (RPEs) are thought to drive learning. This has been 
firmly established in procedural learning paradigms (i.e., classical and operant 
conditioning). However, empirical evidence on whether RPEs drive declarative 
learning – a quintessentially human form of learning – remains surprisingly 
absent. In this study, we used a declarative learning paradigm in which RPEs 
were coupled to the acquisition of Dutch-Swahili word pairs. The memory 
performance for these word pairs was subsequently tested in a recognition test, 
either immediate or after a one-day delay. The results demonstrate a causal effect 
of signed RPEs on declarative learning, with larger RPEs leading to better 
recognition on the immediate test and even stronger benefits on the delayed test. 
In addition, we demonstrate that classic declarative memory mechanisms such as 
time-on-task fail to explain the recognition performance. Importantly, these 
results offer a powerful reinterpretation of the testing effect, with key implications 
for education. 
                                                     
1
 De Loof, E., Naert, L., Van Opstal, F., & Verguts, T. (submitted). Signed reward 
prediction errors drive declarative learning. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Declarative and procedural learning are key assets of the human brain. 
Ever since Thorndike (Thorndike, 1932), it has been thought that reward is 
crucial for both forms of learning. Additionally, inspired by the phenomenon of 
blocking (Kamin, 1969), Rescorla and Wagner proposed and modeled the 
concept that reward prediction is crucial for learning, and that learning occurs 
mainly for unexpected reward outcomes (i.e., reward prediction errors, RPEs; 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Their classic model foreshadowed many decades of 
work to come in the conditioning literature (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 
1980). A recent surge of interest in this concept results from the remarkable 
synergy between dopaminergic recordings in the mammal brainstem (i.e., the 
neural signature of RPEs; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997) and the temporal-
difference RPE model (Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996; Sutton & Barto, 
1998). Similar views on the role of RPEs in learning were developed in other 
prominent theoretical frameworks (e.g., predictive coding; Friston & Kiebel, 
2009; neoHebbian account; Lisman, Grace, & Duzel, 2011). In ensuing empirical 
research, the effect of RPEs has been amply demonstrated in procedural learning 
paradigms such as classical and operant conditioning (Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 
2003; Pagnoni, Zink, Montague, & Berns, 2002; Sevenster, Beckers, & Kindt, 
2013; Steinberg et al., 2013). However, in these procedural learning paradigms 
RPEs gradually shape the acquisition of stimulus-response contingencies over 
multiple encounters. This is distinct from the typically human ability to learn 
(verbal, stimulus-stimulus) information through a single encounter by declarative 
learning. This type of learning is, however, costly and subject to interference. The 
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brain must therefore decide what information to prioritize for storage. How it 
achieves this remains a critical gap in the literature. 
We investigated whether RPEs prioritize information during declarative 
learning. While RPEs have been demonstrated to enhance procedural learning, 
the current lack of evidence on the link between RPEs and declarative learning is 
a crucial gap in the literature as declarative learning is a quintessentially human 
form of learning that is important in everyday life (e.g., in education). 
Nevertheless, findings from procedural learning provide clear predictions on the 
role of RPEs in declarative learning. According to the neoHebbian learning 
framework (Lisman et al., 2011), dopamine bursts generated by the ventral 
tegmental area (VTA) and projected to the hippocampus amplify long term 
potentiation (LTP). As a consequence, phasic dopamine bursts during learning 
result in better memory, especially after a delay including sleep (O’Neill, 
Pleydell-Bouverie, Dupret, & Csicsvari, 2010). Rodent research has demonstrated 
that dopamine bursts enhance learning of spatial information, even through a 
single encounter (Bethus, Tse, & Morris, 2010). Given that dopamine is thought 
to implement RPEs (Cohen, Haesler, Vong, Lowell, & Uchida, 2012; Eshel et al., 
2015; Montague et al., 1996), it can be expected that RPEs enhance declarative 
learning. To date, however, there is no direct empirical evidence for a beneficial 
role of RPEs in declarative learning. 
In the current study we set out to experimentally manipulate RPEs in 
declarative learning. We administered Dutch-Swahili word pairs to participants 
by presenting them with a Dutch word accompanied by one, two or four possible 
Swahili translations to choose from (acquisition phase). By manipulating the 
number of available options, we manipulated the reward probability and hence 
the reward prediction (error). In this way, during feedback, positive and negative 
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RPEs of known and various sizes were coupled to the valid Dutch-Swahili word 
pairs (see Figure 1); allowing us to empirically test for the first time whether 
RPEs drive declarative learning. We subsequently probed recognition in an 
immediate or one-day delayed test (recognition phase). Forty participants 
performed the experiment (twenty in each group) after giving informed consent. 
To start, we tested the predictions from the classic time-on-task account. 
According to this account, longer deliberation on a particular Dutch-Swahili word 
pair would improve its retention. Next, we distinguished two possible RPE 
effects. A first possibility is that signed RPEs (SRPEs) (“better than expected” 
signals) determine learning. This account predicts that positive RPEs (i.e., 
receiving a higher reward than expected) improve learning while negative RPEs 
(i.e., receiving a lower reward than expected) abate learning. This would be 
consistent for example with how SRPEs are used to train Actors in Actor-Critic 
models, for example using the delta-rule (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) or the 
temporal-difference model (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Sutton & Barto, 1998). A 
second possibility is that unsigned RPEs (URPEs) (“different than expected” 
signals) drive learning, with large (both positive and negative) RPEs bolstering 
learning. This would reflect the established role of surprise in learning (Bryden, 
Johnson, Tobia, Kashtelyan, & Roesch, 2011; Hayden, Heilbronner, Pearson, & 
Platt, 2011). Hence, by testing whether negative RPEs enhance or abate learning 
we empirically disentangle two theoretical accounts on how RPEs can drive 
declarative learning. 
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Figure 1: Experiment overview (a) and experimental design (b). (a) Participants chose 
between one, two or four Swahili translations in the acquisition phase; the two-option 
condition with correct choice is illustrated. Recognition and certainty were probed 
immediately or after a one-day delay. (b) The 3 (number of options)  2 (accuracy of 
choice) experimental design, including number of trials and associated signed and 
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unsigned RPE (SRPE and URPE). SRPE was calculated by subtracting probability of 
reward from actual reward; URPE is the absolute value of SRPE. The feedback is 
illustrated assuming that the participant chose ‘kito’ as the translation for ‘worm’. 
METHODS 
Participants 
Forty participants (all university students; 8 male) enrolled in the study and 
were rewarded € 10 for their participation. All participants were naive to the 
purpose of the experiment, had no prior knowledge of Swahili and had not 
previously taken part in any experiment involving Swahili words. Half of the 
participants were randomly assigned to perform the recognition test immediately 
after the acquisition task and the other half performed the recognition test one day 
later. One gift voucher of € 20 was awarded to the participant with the best 
performance on the immediate recognition test and a second voucher was given 
to the participant with the best performance on the recognition test one day later. 
All participants signed an informed consent before the start of the experiment and 
were debriefed afterwards. 
Material 
The experiment was run on an Asus 1215N netbook running Eprime 
software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2012). For the declarative learning 
task, 60 Dutch and 240 Swahili words were selected (Table 1). 
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Table 1: Stimulus material 
Swahili words (240) 
adhabu chupi jeraha kioo maisha msitu nyundo surali 
adui daima jibini kisiwa maji msumari nyundu takatak 
afya dakika jikoni kisu mali mtawa nzuri tamasha 
aibu daraja jiwe kitanda mamba mtirka ofisi tanuri 
akili dari jokofu kitande mapafu mundamo osha tembo 
alizeti dizeli jua kiti mashua mungu panya trekta 
amani duka jumatu kito matumai mvringo petye tumbili 
asili elfu  juuya kitovu matumbo mvua picha tumbo 
baadaye farasi kaburi kofia maua mvuke pombe twai 
bafuni fedha kahawa kovuli mazishi mwanake punda uadui 
bahari filimbi kalamu kuacha mbolea mwanga punguza uchorai 
baharia funzi kamba kuandika mbuzi mwezi pwani ufagio 
baiski furaha kamwe kubale mbwa mzungu rafiki ugomvi 
bandari garisi kartasi kubwa mchanga nanga rangi uhuru 
barua geza katika kudhibi mchawi nchi rombus ukame 
basi godoro kawaida kuhesa mchuzi ndaniya sabuni ukweli 
bega goti kazi  kujenga mdudu ndege sahani umasijo 
bendi gundi kelele kukimba mechezo ndevu samaki uongo 
bilaska guruwe kemia kumba mekno ndizi sayari usiku 
bloke haki kengele kumbuka mfuko ndogo seesaw uyoga 
buli hamsi kesho kununa mgonjwa ndoora sehemu viatu 
bunifu hasira kiatu kunywa miaka ndugu seri wakala 
bustani hatua kichwa kupanda mkasi neyemba shimoni washia 
chaki hazini kidole kusanya mkate ngazi shule welder 
chombo hofu kifua kushoto mkoba ngono simu wengine 
choori ijayo kihozi kusikiza mkuu ngozi singizi wimbo 
chubani imani kijiko kuzama mlango nopya soko wingi 
chuki ishara kikapu kweli moyo nyange starehe wingu 
chuma ishiri kimysa leso mpishi nyeusi stork yatima 
chupa jansa kinywa mageho mraba nyota sufuria zeituni 
 
Dutch words (60) 
agent bord ezel kaas mest rijst stoel wolk 
anker brief fiets kassa nacht schat stoom wonde 
appel bril goud knie neus sjaal stuur worm 
bezem broek graf laken olijf slaap touw zomer 
bier brood hamer lamp oven slang trein  
bloem doos haven lepel paard slot tuin  
boer eend hond lijm poort stier verf  
boot emmer hoofd melk regen stift water  
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Procedure 
At the start of the experiment, participants were informed about the four 
parts of the study: the familiarization task, the acquisition task, the filler task and 
the recognition test (see below for a detailed description of each part). 
Participants knew they could earn at least € 8 but possibly more than € 10 during 
the acquisition task and could receive an additional gift voucher of € 20 if they 
had the best recognition performance. The gift voucher was shown to the 
participants at the start of the experiment and again at the start of the recognition 
test. Participants took part in the experiment in pairs to increase their involvement 
in the acquisition task and recognition test. 
Familiarization task. In order to familiarize the participants with the 
stimuli used in the experiment, all Dutch and Swahili words were presented in 
random order at the start of the experiment. Each word appeared at the center of 
the screen for two seconds. Participants were instructed to read the words in 
silence and push a response button when a Dutch word appeared. The 
familiarization task lasted about nine minutes. 
Acquisition task. At the start of the acquisition task, participants were 
informed that they were about to learn 60 Dutch-Swahili word pairs. During this 
task they would be able to gain at least € 8 and possibly more than € 10. In 
addition they were reminded of the recognition test that would follow the 
experiment and of the additional gift voucher of € 20 for the participant with the 
best recognition performance. 
At the start of each trial, one Dutch word was presented at the top of the 
screen with four Swahili words below (Figure 1a). All words remained on screen 
for four seconds and participants were instructed to read the options. Next, a 
SIGNED REWARD PREDICTION ERRORS  
DRIVE DECLARATIVE LEARNING     71 
frame appeared around the possible Swahili translations for the Dutch word. In 
the one-option condition only one Swahili word was framed, thus immediately 
indicating the correct Swahili translation. In the two-option condition a frame 
appeared around two Swahili words so participants had a 50% chance of 
choosing the correct translation. Finally, in the four-option condition all four 
Swahili words were framed and the participant thus had a 25% chance of 
choosing the correct Swahili translation. Four response buttons were assigned to 
the four word positions and participants responded with the index and middle 
finger of their left and right hand. There was no time constraint on the decision 
but participants were encouraged to follow their first impression. 
After the participants chose a Swahili translation, feedback on the correct 
translation was given. The Dutch word, an equation sign and the correct Swahili 
word appeared at the center of the screen. If the chosen Swahili translation was 
correct, a green frame was presented around the Dutch word and the chosen 
Swahili word, while participants heard the sound of money tumbling in a cup 
(three seconds). Alternatively, if the chosen Swahili translation was incorrect, a 
red frame appeared around the Dutch word and one of the other possible Swahili 
word options, while an error buzz was played (three seconds). The words 
remained on the screen for five seconds and participants were instructed to use 
this time to learn the word pair by heart for the recognition test. Finally, the trial 
ended with a 2.5 seconds presentation of the total amount of reward collected 
thus far. Participants won € 0.28 on correct trials; no money was added on error 
trials. 
Filler task. A brief filler task was inserted to reduce recency effects in the 
immediate recognition test. In order to keep both versions of the experiment as 
similar as possible, the filler task was also presented to participants who would 
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perform the recognition test one day later. Participants categorized numbers 
between 1 and 9 (excluding 5) as being smaller or larger than 5 (left and right 
button presses respectively). A total of 400 numbers were presented and the filler 
task took about four minutes. 
Recognition test. At the start of the recognition test, participants were 
reminded about the additional gift voucher of € 20 for the participant with the 
best recognition performance. The display layout for the recognition test was 
similar to that of the acquisition task. The Dutch word appeared at the top of the 
screen with the same four Swahili words below. However, the order of the four 
Swahili words was randomized and participants were warned about this change. 
As soon as the words appeared, participants could choose between the four 
Swahili words by using the same four response buttons as in the acquisition task. 
No time constraints were imposed on their answer. After a Swahili word was 
chosen, participants indicated how certain they were about their answer: ‘very 
uncertain’, ’rather uncertain’, ’rather certain’ or ‘very certain’ (measured on a 
scale from 1 ‘very uncertain’ to 4 ‘very certain’). No feedback was given about 
the accuracy of their Swahili translation. 
Design 
Unbeknownst to the participants, the accuracy of the chosen translations in 
the acquisition task was determined in advance. More specifically, a fixed 
number of trials was assigned to each cell of the design and trials were 
predetermined to have one, two or four valid Swahili options and to be correct or 
incorrect (Figure 1b). Note that by predetermining whether a translation would be 
correct or not, participants did not necessarily learn the correct Swahili 
translations of the Dutch words. For example, if a trial had been determined to be 
a two-option trial with a correct answer, the participants would be rewarded 
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irrespective of their choice and this chosen word would be the translation they 
had to memorize for the recognition test. Moreover, for each Dutch word four 
randomly drawn Swahili words were presented, often not including the actual 
translation. Participants were informed about this manipulation afterwards. 
The SRPEs were calculated by subtracting the reward probability (i.e., 1, 
0.5 and 0.25 probability of a correct choice in the one-, two- and four-option 
condition, respectively) from the actual received reward (i.e., 1 reward on correct 
trials and 0 reward on incorrect trials). Thus a unique SRPE was calculated for 
each cell in the design, ranging from -0.50 to 0.75 (see Figure 1b for a full 
overview). The URPEs were calculated by taking the absolute value of the 
SRPEs. Note that this merely reverses the sign of the RPEs for the unrewarded 
word pairs. 
RESULTS 
Three participants were removed from the dataset because of technical 
failures during the experiment. Further analyses are performed on the data of the 
remaining 19 participants in the immediate recognition test group and 18 in the 
delayed recognition test group. All participants performed the acquisition task 
according to the instructions, choosing a valid option in 99.5% of the trials (trials 
with invalid choices were excluded from further analyses). As participants were 
free to deliberate on their answer in the recognition test without any time 
restriction, all further analyses will focus exclusively on recognition accuracies 
and certainty ratings. 
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The effect of reward and number of options 
First, we probed how the reward and the number of options in the 
acquisition task influenced the recognition rate. Recognition accuracies were 
entered into a generalized linear mixed effects model with a random intercept 
across participants and the test delay, the number of options and the reward as 
fixed effects predictors. Recognition accuracy was significantly higher in the 
immediate test than in the delayed test, 2(1, N = 37) = 15.7, p < 0.001. 
Recognition accuracies ranged from 40% to 90% (M = 67.4%, SD = 14.4%) for 
the immediate test group and from 27% to 73% (M = 50.7%, SD = 11.6%) for the 
delayed test group. As Figure 2 reveals, there was a significant main effect of 
reward, 2(1, N = 37) = 24.5, p < 0.001, with rewarded choices being 
remembered more accurately. In addition, the recognition rate significantly 
increased with an increasing number of options, 2(1, N = 37) = 36.8, p < 0.001.  
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Figure 2: For the unrewarded (panel a) and rewarded word pairs (panel b) in the 
immediate test group and their equivalent in the delayed test (panels c and d), the 
recognition rate (y-axis) is plotted as a function of the number of options (x-axis). Note 
that in the one-option condition the chosen translation was always rewarded. Recognition 
performance was higher on the immediate test compared to the delayed test and a 
generalized linear mixed effects model revealed a significant increase in recognition rate 
with an increasing number of options and a better performance for rewarded word pairs 
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(black regression line with gray 95% confidence band). For each number of options and 
depending on the reward and delay, the average RT and 95% confidence interval was 
estimated and superimposed. 
Classic declarative learning mechanisms: time-on-task 
We verified whether variations in time-on-task could account for the 
positive effect of number of options on recognition. As participants were allowed 
an unlimited amount of time to choose between the Swahili word options during 
the acquisition task, variations in time-on-task could result in better recognition. 
However, the time-on-task account failed to explain the positive effect of the 
number of options as revealed by the following two additional tests.  
First, we tested whether longer deliberation on individual trials would lead 
to better recognition. To approximate the time devoted to each option (word) on a 
particular trial, we divided the time-on-task by the number of options. The 
resulting time-on-task per option (time-on-word) revealed that each option was 
examined longer when less options were available (the mean time-on-word on the 
one-, two- or four-option trials was 2880 ms, 1826 ms and 1169 ms, 
respectively). Next, we tested whether increased time-on-word would lead to 
better recognition. Recognition accuracies were entered into a generalized linear 
mixed effects model with a random intercept across participants and the test delay 
and time-on-word as fixed effects predictors. Counter to the predictions from the 
time-on-task account, there was no significant influence of time-on-word on 
recognition, 2(1, N = 37) = 1.48, p = 0.22. Follow-up tests for one-, two- or four-
option trials separately confirmed that recognition was not significantly 
influenced by the time-on-word (one-option trials, 2(1, N = 37) = 0.096, p = 
0.76; two-option trials, 2(1, N = 37) = 0.026, p = 0.87; four-option trials, 2(1, N 
= 37) = 2.52, p = 0.11). The result of the one-option trials is particularly 
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interesting as participant could already start learning the word pair during the 
deliberation time. Still, even in the one-option condition longer deliberation on 
the valid Dutch-Swahili word pair failed to result in better declarative learning. 
Second, we tested whether participants who deliberated longer recognized 
more word pairs. The recognition accuracies were entered into a generalized 
linear mixed effects model with a random intercept across participants and the 
test delay and average time-on-task per participant as fixed effects predictors. The 
results show that recognition was not significantly influenced by the average 
time-on-task across participants, 2(1, N = 37) = 0.0022, p = 0.96. The same 
analysis was repeated separately for trials with one, two or four options. None of 
these analyses revealed an influence of the average time-on-task across 
participants on the recognition accuracies (one-option trials, 2(1, N = 37) = 0.35, 
p = 0.55; two-option trials, 2(1, N = 37) = 0.57, p = 0.45; four-option trials, 2(1, 
N = 37) = 1.69, p = 0.19). Again, it is interesting to note that even in the one-
option trials, people who examined word pairs longer had no increased 
recognition accuracy. In sum, declarative learning was not accurately predicted 
by the time-on-task account, as allotting more time to the word pairs had no 
impact on subsequent recognition. 
The effect of positive and negative RPEs 
To further investigate the effect of RPEs on declarative learning, we 
disentangled the role of positive and negative RPEs by probing the interaction 
between the number of options and reward. Recognition accuracies were entered 
into a generalized linear mixed effects model with a random intercept across 
participants and the test delay, the number of options and the reward as fixed 
effects predictors. Contrary to the URPE account, but consistent with the SRPE 
account, there was no significant interaction between the number of options and 
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reward, 2(1, N = 37) = 1.42, p = 0.23. There were also no interactions with the 
test delay (all p > 0.20).  
The same pattern of results were obtained when the certainty ratings were 
entered into a linear mixed effects model with a random intercept across 
participants and the test delay, recognition accuracy, the number of options and 
the reward as fixed effects predictors. There was a main effect of the number of 
options, 2(1, N = 37) = 27.7, p < 0.001, a main effect of reward, 2(1, N = 37) = 
8.38, p = 0.0038, and no significant interaction between the number of options 
and reward, 2(1, N = 37) = 1.29, p = 0.26, or any other significant interactions 
involving the number of options or the reward (all p > 0.10). 
So far, the data failed to support the URPE account as there was no 
significant interaction between the number of options and the reward. Moreover, 
the positive effect of the number of Swahili word options on recognition rates in 
the unrewarded trials (Figure 2a and 2c) supports the SRPE account and refutes 
the URPE account. To pit the SRPE and URPE accounts against one another 
more directly, the recognition accuracies of the unrewarded trials were entered 
into a generalized linear mixed effects model with a random intercept across 
participants and the test delay and the number of options as fixed effects 
predictors. In line with the positive effect suggested in Figure 2a and 2c, there 
was a significant effect of the number of options, 2(1, N = 37) = 9.49, p = 
0.0021, with higher recognition rates for trials associated with more Swahili word 
options. There was also a significant main effect of test delay, 2(1, N = 37) = 
18.09, p < 0.001, but there was no significant interaction between the test delay 
and the number of options, 2(1, N = 37) = 0.25, p = 0.61. 
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SRPEs as a linear predictor of declarative learning 
To formally probe whether declarative memory performance increases 
linearly with SRPEs, recognition accuracies were entered into a generalized linear 
mixed effects model with a random intercept across participants and the test delay 
and SRPEs as fixed effects predictors. As Figure 3a and 3b illustrates, recognition 
improved significantly with increasing SRPEs, 2(1, N = 37) = 27.4, p < 0.001. 
The interaction between SRPEs and delay was not significant, 2(1, N = 37) = 
2.52, p = 0.11, and Figure 3a and 3b clearly illustrates a significant effect of 
SRPEs in the immediate test group, 2(1, N = 19) = 6.20, p = 0.013, and an even 
stronger effect in the delayed test group, 2(1, N = 18) = 23.6, p < 0.001. Note 
that the recognition in the delayed test is especially lower for negative RPEs but 
remains high for positive RPEs. 
The linear effect of SRPEs on declarative learning was further validated by 
the certainty ratings (Figure 3c and 3d). The certainty ratings were entered into a 
linear mixed effects model with a random intercept across participants and the 
test delay, recognition accuracy and SRPEs as fixed effects predictors. In line 
with the effect of SRPEs on recognition, there was a significant main effect of 
SRPEs on the certainty ratings, 2(1, N = 37) = 9.49, p = 0.0021, with higher 
SRPEs leading to higher certainty ratings. While there was no significant 
interaction between the effect of SRPEs and test delay, 2(1, N = 37) = 0.039, p = 
0.84, there was a significant interaction between SRPEs and recognition 
accuracy, 2(1, N = 37) = 4.56, p = 0.033, and a marginally significant three-way 
interaction, 2(1, N = 37) = 3.25, p = 0.071. Follow-up tests revealed that SRPEs 
had no significant effect on certainty ratings for the false recognitions (neither in 
the immediate test group, 2(1, N = 19) = 1.76, p = 0.18, nor the delayed test 
group, 2(1, N = 18) = 2.021, p = 0.16), but did significantly predict certainty 
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ratings for the correctly recognized word pairs in the immediate, 2(1, N = 19) = 
4.24, p = 0.039, and delayed test group, 2(1, N = 18) = 7.27, p = 0.0070. The fact 
that the SRPEs only influence certainty ratings for the correct recognitions and 
not for false alarms further corroborates our finding that SRPEs indeed drive 
declarative learning. 
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Figure 3: For the immediate and delayed test, the recognition (panel a and b; y-axis) and 
certainty ratings (panel c and d; y-axis) are plotted as a function of the SRPEs (x-axis). 
For the word pairs associated with each SRPE, the average recognition and certainty 
ratings and their 95% confidence intervals were superimposed. (a and b) Recognition 
increased significantly with SRPEs (black regression line with gray 95% confidence 
band). (c and d) Certainty ratings for the false recognitions (depicted in orange) were not 
significantly different across SRPEs, while higher SRPEs led to significantly higher 
certainty ratings for correctly recognized word pairs (depicted in blue). 
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DISCUSSION 
Our results provide the first empirical demonstration that RPEs prioritize 
declarative learning, in both immediate and delayed recognition. Positive and 
negative RPEs of known and various sizes were generated by manipulating the 
number of options available during word pair acquisition. Our analysis revealed 
that larger and more positive RPEs lead to better recognition and increased 
certainty of the word pairs, as evident in both an immediate and delayed 
recognition test. Thus, while the importance of URPEs (“different than expected” 
signals; Bryden et al., 2011; Hayden et al., 2011) has been shown in procedural 
learning paradigms (Pearce & Hall, 1980; Sevenster et al., 2013; Steinberg et al., 
2013) our analysis indicates that declarative learning is driven by SRPEs (“better 
than expected” signals). 
These results further our understanding of how motivational cues 
determine which information is prioritized for encoding in memory. As discussed 
previously, the neoHebbian learning framework (Lisman et al., 2011) describes 
how phasic dopamine bursts enhance hippocampal LTP by strengthened 
consolidation. Consolidation is thought to occur especially during sleep, which 
may explain why our effects were stronger after a night of sleep. Critically, these 
dopamine bursts can be caused by a variety of motivational cues such as RPEs, 
novelty and salience. Previous research has indeed demonstrated the effect of 
reward anticipation in declarative learning (Adcock, Thangavel, Whitfield-
Gabrieli, Knutson, & Gabrieli, 2006; Wittmann et al., 2005), the effect of 
exposure to novel environments (Fenker et al., 2008) and the effect of salient 
(emotional) stimuli more generally (Anderson, Wais, & Gabrieli, 2006). 
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Critically, we provide a first empirical validation of the effect of RPEs on 
declarative memory. 
In addition to an empirical validation of the effect of RPEs on declarative 
memory, our results also offer an alternative explanation for established learning 
strategies such as learning by testing (i.e., the testing effect; Gates, 1917). In a 
seminal publication, Karpicke and Roediger empirically manipulated the amount 
of study and test trials allotted to Swahili-English word pairs (Karpicke & 
Roediger, 2008). In a follow-up test one week later, the authors found that 
additional study trials during the acquisition session had no strong beneficial 
effect on retention. Conversely, recall was strongly enhanced by additional test 
trials during acquisition. Although this testing effect has consistently been 
observed to drive declarative learning and holds major educational implications 
(Howard-Jones, 2014), its origin has remained unclear. Based on our current 
findings, we argue that the testing effect could be ascribed to RPEs. Specifically, 
a test crucially involves making a prediction about what the correct answer might 
be and about the probability of success. These active predictions and their 
entailing RPEs may drive declarative learning (even in the absence of external 
feedback; Aarts, Houwer, & Pourtois, 2012; Schouppe et al., 2015). An 
interesting case in point is a study in which participants learned cue-target word 
pairs with a strong or weak semantic association (Carpenter, 2009). Whereas 
restudying the material equally improved the retention of strongly and weakly 
associated word pairs, repeated testing improved recall of weakly associated work 
pairs more compared to strongly associated words. Moreover, by the final test the 
recall for the weak semantic associations surpassed that of the strong semantic 
associations. Although counter-intuitive at first glance, these findings follow 
naturally from the beneficial effect of RPEs on declarative learning. More 
broadly, the natural occurrence of RPEs during learning might be why testing, 
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elaborative interrogation and self-explanation outperform other active learning 
strategies such as summarizing, keyword mnemonics and imagery (Dunlosky, 
Rawson, Marsh, Nathan, & Willingham, 2013). 
In sum, we demonstrate for the first time that SRPEs drive declarative 
learning, closing the gap between research on reward learning and declarative 
memory. Our results are in line with the neoHebbian learning framework and 
suggest new avenues to improve learning in both informal and educational 
settings. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
THE MODULATION OF EEG OSCILLATIONS BY 
REWARD PREDICTION ERRORS DRIVES DECLARATIVE 
LEARNING 
1
 
The effect of reward prediction errors (RPEs) on learning has been well 
established, mainly in procedural learning paradigms. It is generally 
assumed that RPEs also drive declarative learning, a typically human form 
of learning widely used in everyday life (e.g., in education). However, little 
empirical evidence has validated this claim. In a previous study (chapter 3) 
we therefore provided the first empirical demonstration of enhanced 
declarative learning due to RPEs. By parametrically manipulating the RPEs 
experienced during reward feedback we were able to boost the acquisition of 
Dutch-Swahili word pairs. In the current time-frequency EEG study we 
verify whether participants experience RPEs during reward feedback and 
whether declarative learning is indeed driven by these RPEs, rather than by 
related acquisition processes. The behavioral results offer a full replication 
of the previous study: Word pairs associated with a large, positive RPE are 
recognized with higher accuracy and certainty. Additionally, our results 
confirm that RPEs modulate EEG oscillations during reward feedback, 
confirming the experience of a “better-than-expected” signal. Moreover, the 
alpha suppression during reward feedback was predictive for the 
recognition performance in the delayed recognition test. In sum, our results 
confirm that the neural mechanisms activated by RPEs during procedural 
learning are also activated during declarative learning. In addition, the 
activation of this reward mechanism predicted declarative recognition in a 
follow-up test. 
                                                     
1
De Loof, E., Ergo, K., Janssens, C., Van Opstal, F., & Verguts, T. (in preparation). 
The modulation of EEG oscillations by reward prediction errors drives declarative 
learning. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Reward is one of the most important arbiters to determine what 
information should be prioritized for learning. Research in reward learning 
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), computational modeling (Montague, Dayan, & 
Sejnowski, 1996) and single-cell recoding (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 
1997), has amply demonstrated that learning is not predominantly regulated 
by obtained rewards but mainly by the difference between the obtained and 
expected reward (the reward prediction error, RPE). However, this research 
has been largely restricted to procedural learning, probably because of its 
long tradition in animal research (Squire, 2004). In these procedural learning 
paradigms RPEs gradually shape the acquisition of stimulus-response 
contingencies over multiple encounters. This is distinct from the typically 
human ability to learn (verbal, stimulus-stimulus) information through a 
single encounter by declarative learning. Although it is often suggested that 
RPEs also boost declarative learning (den Ouden, Friston, Daw, McIntosh, 
& Stephan, 2009; Hyman, Malenka, & Nestler, 2006), this claim had not 
been verified in empirical research on humans. Interestingly, a number of 
well-established effects in declarative learning hint at an involvement of 
RPEs. One of these effects is the testing effect (Gates, 1917; Karpicke & 
Roediger, 2008) which entails that learned information is quickly forgotten 
after mere repeated practice but remains high when one is being tested on the 
acquired knowledge. From a reward learning perspective, this testing effect 
could be interpreted as the effect of RPEs, as especially during testing 
predictions may be generated and evaluated. 
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To bridge this gap, in a previous declarative learning experiment 
(chapter 3) we parametrically manipulated RPEs during the acquisition of 60 
Dutch-Swahili word pairs. By letting participants choose among one, two or 
four possible Swahili translations for a Dutch word, we varied the reward 
probability and hence the ensuing reward prediction (error). In this way, 
during feedback, RPEs of manipulated (and known) intensity were coupled 
to the Dutch-Swahili word pairs, allowing us to empirically test for the first 
time whether RPEs drive declarative learning. By probing word pair 
recognition in an immediate and delayed test we demonstrated that 
declarative learning was indeed boosted by RPEs. More specifically, word 
pairs that were accompanied by a large RPE resulted in better recognition in 
a follow-up recognition test, both in terms of accuracy and certainty ratings. 
In addition to providing a first experimental demonstration that RPEs 
indeed play a crucial role in declarative learning, we also excluded a number 
of alternative interpretations. To start, the alternative time-on-task 
interpretation (Hebb, 1949) was excluded by demonstrating that longer 
deliberation (e.g., caused by choosing among one, two or four options) failed 
to foster better recognition. We also formally differentiated between the 
influence of negative and positive RPEs on recognition. A first theoretical 
possibility we envisioned, was that only the size of the RPE matters and not 
its valence. These unsigned RPEs (URPEs) can be interpreted as “different-
than-expected” signals and their influence on learning parallels the role of 
surprise in learning (Bryden, Johnson, Tobia, Kashtelyan, & Roesch, 2011; 
Hayden, Heilbronner, Pearson, & Platt, 2011). In a second possible scenario, 
large positive RPEs would enhance learning while large negative RPEs 
hinder learning. These signed RPEs (SRPEs) can thus be interpreted as 
“better-than-expected” signals, reflecting how RPEs are used to train Actors 
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in Actor-Critic models (Sutton & Barto, 1998), for example using the 
temporal-difference model (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Montague et al., 1996). 
The results of our previous study (chapter 3) clearly support the role 
of RPEs as “better-than-expected” signals, as recall was driven by SRPEs. 
Indeed, recognition accuracy and certainty ratings were mainly enhanced by 
large positive RPEs but not by large negative RPEs. These results were 
overall in line with the neoHebbian learning framework (Lisman, Grace, & 
Duzel, 2011) which details the way in which SRPEs can modulate memory 
formation. According to this framework, SRPEs cause the ventral tegmental 
area (VTA) to trigger a dopaminergic pathway with projections to the 
hippocampus. Memory traces in the hippocampus that were active when the 
dopaminergic pathway was activated are consolidated more strongly through 
long term potentiation (LTP) during sleep. This LTP account fits nicely with 
the data from our previous study, where the effect of SRPEs on learning was 
even more pronounced after a one-day delay. It is also consistent with the 
literature on the testing effect (Karpicke & Blunt, 2011; Karpicke & 
Roediger, 2008), where the advantages of being tested become more 
apparent in the recognition test as time progresses (e.g., after a delay of one 
week compared to an immediate test). 
However, to confirm that the experience of a SRPE is the actual driver 
of improved declarative learning, we need to demonstrate that participants 
are actually experiencing a SRPE; and second we need to demonstrate that 
these experienced SRPEs indeed predict improved recognition. To do so, we 
adapted our declarative learning paradigm (chapter 3) to an EEG design 
suited for time-frequency analysis. This EEG experiment not only allowed 
us to replicate the behavioral findings from our previous study, it also 
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offered a validation of the proposed neural underpinnings of the effect of 
SRPEs on declarative learning by detailing more thoroughly how reward 
feedback influences word pair acquisition. First, we hypothesized that 
SRPEs would modulate EEG oscillations during reward feedback, reflecting 
the experience of a “better-than-expected” signal. In line with previous 
research on the modulation of the oscillatory power due to RPEs, we 
expected to see the influence of RPEs reflected in the theta (4-8 Hz; Cohen, 
Elger, & Ranganath, 2007), alpha (8-12 Hz; Oya et al., 2005) or high-beta 
frequency band (20-30 Hz; HajiHosseini & Holroyd, 2015a). Second, we 
tested whether the oscillatory power during acquisition could predict the 
accuracy and certainty ratings during the recognition test. Importantly, 
compared to the previous study we differentiated the feedback during the 
acquisition task into three separate components: reward anticipation, reward 
feedback (correct versus incorrect) and word pair encoding. This allowed us 
to pinpoint in which phase SRPEs were reflected by oscillatory power 
modulations and in which phase these power modulations were predictive 
for improved performance in the recognition test. Based on the 
reinforcement learning framework, we hypothesized that SRPEs influence 
learning during reward feedback. Alternatively, the SRPEs could influence 
declarative learning in a more indirect fashion, e.g. through adaptive 
processes during word pair encoding (Ridderinkhof, Van Den Wildenberg, 
Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004). 
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METHOD 
Participants 
Forty-one Dutch speaking, right-handed participants were recruited 
for the study. All participants had normal color vision, were naive to the 
purpose of the experiment, had no prior knowledge of Swahili and had not 
previously been enrolled in any experiment involving Swahili words. A 
random selection of twenty participants (15 female, 25.6 years on average) 
performed the recognition test immediately after the acquisition task and the 
other twenty-one participants (18 female, 25.5 years on average) performed 
the recognition test one day later. The participants were rewarded € 25 for 
their participation. An additional gift voucher of € 20 was awarded to the 
participant with the best performance on the recognition test. All participants 
signed an informed consent at the start of the experiment and received a 
debriefing afterwards. 
Material 
For the declarative learning task, the same 60 Dutch and 240 Swahili 
words were used as in the previous study (Table 1). The experiment was run 
on a Dell Optiplex 9010 mini-tower running Eprime software (Schneider, 
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2012). Button presses were registered through a 
Cedrus RB-730 response box enhanced with four time-accurate push buttons 
(Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, California). 
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Table 1: Stimulus material 
Swahili words (240) 
adhabu chupi jeraha kioo maisha msitu nyundo surali 
adui daima jibini kisiwa maji msumari nyundu takatak 
afya dakika jikoni kisu mali mtawa nzuri tamasha 
aibu daraja jiwe kitanda mamba mtirka ofisi tanuri 
akili dari jokofu kitande mapafu mundamo osha tembo 
alizeti dizeli jua kiti mashua mungu panya trekta 
amani duka jumatu kito matumai mvringo petye tumbili 
asili elfu  juuya kitovu matumbo mvua picha tumbo 
baadaye farasi kaburi kofia maua mvuke pombe twai 
bafuni fedha kahawa kovuli mazishi mwanake punda uadui 
bahari filimbi kalamu kuacha mbolea mwanga punguza uchorai 
baharia funzi kamba kuandika mbuzi mwezi pwani ufagio 
baiski furaha kamwe kubale mbwa mzungu rafiki ugomvi 
bandari garisi kartasi kubwa mchanga nanga rangi uhuru 
barua geza katika kudhibi mchawi nchi rombus ukame 
basi godoro kawaida kuhesa mchuzi ndaniya sabuni ukweli 
bega goti kazi  kujenga mdudu ndege sahani umasijo 
bendi gundi kelele kukimba mechezo ndevu samaki uongo 
bilaska guruwe kemia kumba mekno ndizi sayari usiku 
bloke haki kengele kumbuka mfuko ndogo seesaw uyoga 
buli hamsi kesho kununa mgonjwa ndoora sehemu viatu 
bunifu hasira kiatu kunywa miaka ndugu seri wakala 
bustani hatua kichwa kupanda mkasi neyemba shimoni washia 
chaki hazini kidole kusanya mkate ngazi shule welder 
chombo hofu kifua kushoto mkoba ngono simu wengine 
choori ijayo kihozi kusikiza mkuu ngozi singizi wimbo 
chubani imani kijiko kuzama mlango nopya soko wingi 
chuki ishara kikapu kweli moyo nyange starehe wingu 
chuma ishiri kimysa leso mpishi nyeusi stork yatima 
chupa jansa kinywa mageho mraba nyota sufuria zeituni 
 
Dutch words (60) 
agent bord ezel kaas mest rijst stoel wolk 
anker brief fiets kassa nacht schat stoom wonde 
appel bril goud knie neus sjaal stuur worm 
bezem broek graf laken olijf slaap touw zomer 
bier brood hamer lamp oven slang trein  
bloem doos haven lepel paard slot tuin  
boer eend hond lijm poort stier verf  
boot emmer hoofd melk regen stift water  
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Electrophysiological data were recorded using a Biosemi ActiveTwo 
system (Biosemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands) with 64 Ag-AgCl electrodes 
arranged in the standard international 10-20 electrode mapping, with a 
posterior CMS-DRL electrode pair. Two reference electrodes were 
positioned at the left and right mastoids. Eye movements were registered 
with a pair of electrodes above and below the left eye and two additional 
electrodes at the outer canti of both eyes. Because of the planned time-
frequency analysis, EEG signals were recorded at a 1024 Hz sampling rate.  
Behavioral task 
Analogous to the previous study (chapter 3), the experiment consisted 
of four parts: the familiarization task, the acquisition task, the filler task and 
the recognition test (either immediate or after a one-day delay). Due to the 
planned time-frequency analysis, the performance feedback in the 
acquisition task and recognition test was spaced out more widely in time (see 
below). Apart from these adaptations to the timing of the experiment to 
accommodate the analysis requirements, the current experiment provides an 
integral replication of the previous study. 
At the start of the experiment, participants were informed they could 
earn at least € 20 but possibly more than € 25 during the acquisition task. 
Furthermore, a gift voucher was presented that would be awarded to the 
participant with the best performance in the recognition test. One gift 
voucher of € 20 was awarded to the participant with the best performance on 
the immediate recognition test and a second voucher was given to the 
participant with the best performance on the recognition test one day later. 
The voucher was presented for a second time at the start of the recognition 
test to remind participants of this additional incentive.  
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Familiarization task. All Dutch and Swahili words were presented in 
random order at the start of the experiment. Each word was displayed for 
two seconds at the center of the screen and participants were asked to read 
the words in silence. To ensure task performance, a button press was 
required for each Dutch word. The familiarization task lasted about ten 
minutes. 
Acquisition task. During the acquisition task participants would learn 
60 Dutch-Swahili word pairs while gaining at least € 20 and possibly more 
than € 25. To encourage learning, participants were reminded of the 
additional gift voucher of € 20 that would be awarded to the participant with 
the best performance in the recognition test following the acquisition task. 
The trial started with the presentation of a fixation cue for two 
seconds. Next, one Dutch word and four Swahili words appeared on the 
screen for four seconds, allowing participants to read through the options 
(Figure 1a). Subsequently, one, two or four Swahili words were framed and 
participants could choose among the framed options to guess the Swahili 
translation matching the Dutch word. Depending on the number of available 
options, participants had a chance of respectively 100%, 50% or 25% of 
guessing the correct translation. Participants were encouraged to follow their 
first impression, although no response deadline was imposed. Responses 
were entered with the index and middle finger of the left and right hand, 
each placed on one of four response buttons assigned to the four Swahili 
word positions. 
When a Swahili translation was chosen, an ellipsis (…) was presented 
for three seconds followed by the reward feedback (‘correct’ or ’error’) 
presented for three seconds. The ellipsis was included in the design in order 
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to separate the reward feedback from the EEG response evoked by the 
preceding button press. Next, the Dutch word and its correct Swahili 
translation appeared for five seconds, to allow participants sufficient time to 
learn the word pair for the recognition test. The reward feedback and the 
word pair were presented in green on correct trials and in red on error trials. 
Lastly, participants were rewarded with € 0.70 on correct trials and € 0 on 
error trials, presented along with the cumulative monetary reward for 2.5 
seconds. 
Prior to the onset of the acquisition task, participants were informed 
that EEG recordings would be made and were asked to assume a 
comfortable position and to avoid unnecessary movements. 
Filler task. Recency effects in the recognition test were avoided by 
inserting a filler task: the categorization of 400 numbers between 1 and 9 
(excluding 5) as being smaller or larger than 5 (left and right button presses 
respectively). Participants who performed the delayed recognition test one 
day later were also presented with the filler task in order to keep both 
versions of the experiment as similar as possible. The filler task took about 
four minutes. 
Recognition test. The recognition test was performed either 
immediately or after a one-day delay. In the group performing the immediate 
test, EEG was recorded during the recognition test and participants were 
asked to assume a comfortable position and avoid unnecessary movements. 
At the start of the recognition test, participants were reminded about 
the additional gift voucher of € 20. The display layout in the recognition test 
paralleled that in the acquisition task. First, a fixation cross was presented 
for two seconds. Next, the Dutch word appeared on the screen, accompanied 
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by the same four Swahili words as in the acquisition task but in a 
randomized order. The Dutch word turned red after four seconds, indicating 
to participants that they could start making a choice by using the same four 
response buttons as in the acquisition task. Participants also rated their 
certainty: ‘very uncertain’, ’rather uncertain’, ’rather certain’ or ‘very 
certain’ (measured on a scale from 1 ‘very uncertain’ to 4 ‘very certain’). No 
response deadline was imposed on the recognition test and certainty rating. 
Next, an ellipsis was presented for three seconds, followed by a blank screen 
for half a second in order to separate the EEG response evoked by the button 
press from that of the ensuing accuracy feedback (the ellipsis was also 
presented to the participants who performed the recognition test after a one-
day delay although no EEG recordings were made in this group). The trials 
ended with the presentation of the accuracy feedback (‘correct’ or ’error’) 
for three seconds. 
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Figure 1: The trial design for the acquisition task and recognition test (panel a) and 
the experimental design of the acquisition task (panel b) are demonstrated. (a) A trial 
in the two-option condition is illustrated. Here, the participant correctly guessed the 
correct Swahili translation ‘kito’ for the Dutch word ‘worm’ in the acquisition task 
and accurately recognized the correct translation in the recognition test. (b) The 3 
(number of options) x 2 (reward feedback in the acquisition task) experimental 
design is illustrated, replicating the design from our previous study (chapter 3). The 
number of trials and the associated signed and unsigned RPE (SRPE and URPE) are 
indicated per cell. The RPE was calculated by subtracting the reward probability 
from the obtained reward. 
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Design 
The 60 Dutch-Swahili word pairs were arranged in the same 3 
(number of options) x 2 (reward feedback in the acquisition task) 
experimental design as in the previous study (chapter 3). Because a fixed 
number of trials was assigned to each cell of the design, we not only 
predetermined the number of options (one, two or four) on each trial of the 
acquisition task but also whether the chosen Swahili translation would be 
considered correct or incorrect. Thus, participants would learn a random 
pairing of Dutch and Swahili words instead of the actual translation. This not 
only made sure we had a fixed number of trials in each cell of the design 
(Figure 1b); it also excluded any linguistic regularities in Dutch-Swahili 
word pairs that could influence learning. Participants were informed about 
this manipulation at the end of the recognition test. 
The SRPEs were calculated by subtracting the reward probability (i.e., 
1, 0.5 and 0.25 probability of a correct choice in the one-, two- and four-
option condition, respectively) from the obtained reward (i.e., 1 reward on 
correct trials and 0 reward on incorrect trials). Thus a unique SRPE ranging 
from -0.50 to 0.75 was calculated for each cell in the design (see Figure 1b 
for a full overview). The URPEs were calculated by taking the absolute 
value of the SRPEs, thus reversing the sign of the RPEs for the unrewarded 
word pairs. 
Data analysis 
Behavioral data. In the familiarization task, accuracies ranged from 
99% to 100% (M = 99.6%, SD = 0.50%). Accuracies in the filler task ranged 
from 91% to 100% (M = 97.7%, SD = 1.84%). Participants chose a valid 
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option in 99.6% of the trials in the acquisition task, indicating that all 
participants performed the experiment according to the instructions and only 
0.4% of the trials had to be removed. 
Unless mentioned otherwise, all statistical analyses on the behavioral 
data were performed within the linear mixed effects models framework. A 
linear mixed effects model was applied for a continuous dependent variable 
(e.g., certainty ratings in the recognition test) and a generalized linear mixed 
effects model was applied for binary dependent variables (e.g., recognition 
accuracy). Each model contained a random intercept across participants and 
centered predictors (e.g., number of options, obtained reward and SRPEs 
during the acquisition task). All analyses were run in R (R Core Team, 
2014). 
EEG preprocessing. Although EEG recordings were made during the 
recognition test in the group who performed the test immediately, the current 
analysis is restricted to the EEG recordings made during the acquisition task 
(recorded in all participants, irrespective of whether they performed the 
recognition test immediately of after a one-day delay). Therefore, from here 
on we will only discuss the processing of the EEG data recorded in the 
acquisition task. 
The data were preprocessed in MATLAB (MATLAB R2013a, The 
MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United State) by applying a custom 
EEGLAB preprocessing pipeline to the data of all participants (Delorme & 
Makeig, 2004). Because of the planned time-frequency analysis, the 1024 Hz 
data were not downsampled. The data were re-referenced offline to the 
average of the mastoid electrodes and visually inspected to remove stretches 
of data with excessive noise (e.g., large movement artifacts). Next, an 
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independent component analysis (ICA) was performed in order to remove 
the eyeblink artifacts. In preparation of the ICA procedure, the data were 
filtered with a 0.5-30 Hz band-pass Butterworth filter and the resulting 
filtered data were visually inspected for filtering artifacts. The filtered data 
were then entered into the EEGLAB ICA procedure with standard settings. 
Afterwards, the resulting ICA weights were added to the unfiltered (but re-
referenced and cleaned) EEG data. The ICA components representing 
eyeblinks and lateral eye movements were selected by taking into account 
the topographic map of the components as well as a comparison between the 
time course of the components and the time course of the frontal EEG 
channels and eye movement electrodes. After the removal of these 
components from the data, the resulting data were again visually inspected. 
Next, electrodes were interpolated when necessary: eleven participants 
required the interpolation of one electrode and one participant required the 
interpolation of two electrodes. Electrode P2 was particularly noisy and 
made up for ten of the thirteen electrode interpolations. The cleaned data 
were subsequently filtered with a 60 Hz low-pass filter. Finally, the data 
were epoched time-locked to the response in the acquisition task (i.e., the 
choice between one, two or four available Swahili translations). The epoch 
extended over 2000 ms before and 13000 ms after the response (including 
the reward anticipation phase, the reward feedback and the word pair 
encoding). 
Time-frequency analysis. The procedure for the time-frequency 
analysis was based on the code provided in chapter 16 of Cohen (2014). In 
order to extract the oscillatory power, a Hanning taper was first applied to 
the epoched EEG data and the tapered data were then subjected to a Fourier 
transformation. Because of the intended single-trial analysis on the power 
 104     CHAPTER 4 
estimates a single Hanning taper was used (Cohen, 2014; Haegens et al., 
2011). The tapering and a fast Fourier transform were performed in a sliding 
time window of 600 ms which was advanced in steps of 100 ms between      
-1500 and 12500 ms relative to the choice of the Swahili translation. The 
oscillatory power was extracted in 18 frequency bands, spaced linearly 
between 1.67 and 30 Hz in steps of 1.67 Hz. Because we were mainly 
interested in the brain response to the reward feedback and during the word 
pair encoding (both during the acquisition task), a baseline correction of 300 
ms before the onset of the reward feedback was applied to the power 
estimates. Lastly, the baseline-corrected data underwent a decibel 
conversion. This time-frequency analysis procedure was performed 
separately for each participant and each electrode.  
The resulting baseline-corrected and decibel-converted oscillatory 
power estimates were coupled to the behavioral data on a trial-by-trial basis. 
In analogy to the behavioral analysis, trials were removed when an invalid 
Swahili translation was chosen in the acquisition task. Combined with the 
removal of EEG data during preprocessing this resulted in a removal of on 
average 1.63% of the power estimates per participant (ranging between 0% 
and 5%). 
Clustering procedure. The goal of the subsequent clustering analyses 
on the power estimates was twofold. First, we wanted to test whether 
oscillatory power in several frequency bands could be predicted by 
parameters from the experimental design (Figure 1b), such as the number of 
options, the obtained reward and the SRPE. Second, we tested whether the 
power estimates could predict learning outcomes in the recognition test such 
as recognition accuracy and certainty ratings. For both types of analyses, the 
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numerous comparisons available across all power estimates necessitated a 
multiple comparisons correction. For example, when performing these 
analyses in the reward feedback phase a comparison would be made in each 
cell of the frequency(18) x time(31) x channels(64) tensor of power 
estimates, resulting in 35712 elements (we will further refer to the cells of 
this tensor as voxels). The same was true for the analyses on the 
frequency(18) x time(51) x channels(64) tensor of power estimates in the 
word pair encoding phase. To tackle this problem, a non-parametric 
clustering procedure based on Maris and Oostenveld (2007) was tailored to 
our paradigm. The clustering procedure will be described for the power 
estimates from the reward feedback phase, but the same procedure was 
applied to the power estimates from the word pair encoding phase. 
For each participant, the power estimates in each voxel of the 
frequency(18) x time(31) x channels(64) tensor was standardized across all 
60 trials. By standardizing across trials, any differences in average power 
estimates across frequencies, time and channels were removed within a 
participant. In addition, differences in average power between participants 
were also removed by the standardization. In this way we simultaneously 
accounted for the difference in oscillatory power across frequencies (e.g., 
lower frequencies typically have higher power estimates) and for different 
noise levels across time, channels and participants. The standardized power 
estimates of all participants and trials (41 participants x 60 trials = 2460 
trials in total) were collected in a frequency(18) x time(31) x channels(64) x 
trials(2460) tensor, further referred to as the TF-tensor.  
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Next, five regressor tensors were constructed, each containing either 
one of the three predictive parameters from the experimental design (number 
of options, obtained reward or SRPE) or one of the two learning outcomes in 
the recognition test (recognition accuracy and certainty ratings). These 
regressor tensors had the same dimensions as the TF-tensor, with the 
regressor value of a particular trial repeated across all frequencies, time 
points and electrodes corresponding to that trial. In each of the five regressor 
tensors, the regressor values were standardized for each participant 
separately. In order to determine the predictive relation between the TF-
tensor and a particular regressor tensor, both tensors were multiplied in a 
voxel-by-voxel way. The resulting frequency(18) x time(31) x channels(64) 
x trials(2460) tensor of trial-level statistics was subsequently summed across 
all 2460 trials, resulting in a frequency(30) x time(31) x channels(64) tensor 
with the voxel-level statistics, further referred to as the VLS-tensor.  
Next a clustering analysis was performed on the VLS-tensor. In this 
clustering analysis, VLS-voxels with extremely high or low voxel-level 
statistics were clustered based on their proximity in frequency, time and 
space (for the spatial domain, the Euclidean distance between the electrodes 
was calculated). A separate clustering analysis was performed on the VLS-
voxels with the 0.5% highest positive statistics and an additional clustering 
was performed on the VLS-voxels with the 0.5% lowest negative statistics. 
In the clustering procedure, the selected VLS-voxels were considered 
neighbors when their electrode position was within 4 cm of one another (see 
Figure 2a) and when they were within one frequency step (1.67 Hz) and one 
time step (100 ms; see Figure 2b). When two selected VLS-voxels were in 
each other’s neighborhood in the frequency, time and spatial domain, they 
were grouped in the same cluster. All resulting clusters were ordered based 
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on the number of voxels in the cluster. For each of the clusters a cluster-level 
statistic was computer by multiplying the number of voxels in the cluster 
with the largest voxel-level statistic within that cluster (the highest positive 
statistic for the positive clusters and the lowest negative statistic for the 
negative clusters).  
  a. Proximity in space                          b. Proximity in frequency and time 
 
Figure 2: For three hypothetical data points in the clustering analysis (depicted in 
dark green, red and orange), their potential neighbors in (a) space as well as (b) 
frequency and time are depicted (in light green, red and orange, respectively). (a) 
Electrodes within 4 cm from the hypothetical data points were considered neighbors. 
Because of the unequal distance between electrodes, the number of spatial neighbors 
varies across hypothetical data points. (b) In addition, neighbors were required to 
fall within one step in the frequency and time domain. Each hypothetical data point 
thus has eight neighbors in the time-frequency domain. Note that although plotted 
separately, simultaneous proximity in frequency, time and space was required for 
being neighbors in the clustering analysis. 
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The resulting clusters were inspected in the frequency-time-space 
domain to confirm the quality of the clustering procedure. An exploratory 
analysis with less stringent criteria for the selection of the voxels based on 
their voxel-level statistic (e.g., selecting the voxels with the 1% highest or 
lowest statistics) or for the determination of the neighborhood (e.g., a wider 
frequency and time range, as well as a larger distance between neighboring 
electrodes) confirmed that the resulting clusters remained stable. 
Non-parametric permutation test. In order to determine the 
significance of the observed positive and negative clusters, a non-parametric 
permutation test was performed on the observed cluster-level statistics. In 
the permutation procedure, a randomized version of the regressor tensor was 
first constructed by randomizing the regressor values for each participant. 
More specifically, the regressor values of all 60 trials for each participant 
were randomized separately before they were entered into the regression 
tensor by repeating them across frequencies, time points and channels. This 
randomized regressor tensor was then multiplied with the empirical TF-
tensor and the resulting (randomized) VLS-tensor were calculated as before. 
This VLS-tensor was again clustered, resulting in a cluster-level statistic for 
each of the random positive and negative clusters. This randomization 
procedure was repeated 1000 times. The resulting random cluster-level 
statics from the randomization procedure were then used to determine the 
significance of the observed cluster-level statistics from the actual data. To 
do so, each observed cluster was matched to a comparable random cluster in 
each of the 1000 iterations in the randomization procedure. The comparable 
random cluster had to match the observed cluster in valence and in relative 
size (e.g., the second largest positive observed cluster was matched to the 
second largest positive randomized cluster within each iteration of the 
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randomization procedure). Thus, the cluster-level statistic from each 
observed cluster could be compared to the randomization distribution of the 
1000 matching random cluster-level statistics. A significance threshold of 
5% was applied to the resulting non-parametric p-values. 
The significant clusters were visualized in a time-frequency plot and a 
topographical plot (see Figure 5). For the time-frequency plot, the voxel-
level statistics pertaining to each significant cluster were summarized across 
channels for each time-frequency combination. The resulting statistics were 
log transformed before plotting. For the topographical plot, a separate plot 
was made per significant cluster. For each channel, the voxel-level statistics 
were summarized across all significant time-frequency combinations. Again, 
the resulting statistics were log transformed before plotting. Thus, a 
topographical plot was constructed for each significant cluster, with a white 
asterisk indicating the channels represented in the cluster. 
RESULTS 
Behavioral results 
Recognition performance on immediate and delayed test. 
Paralleling the results from the previous study (chapter 3), recognition 
accuracy was significantly higher in the immediate test than in the delayed 
test, 2(1, N = 41) = 18.6, p < 0.001. Recognition accuracies ranged from 
37% to 100% for the immediate test group (M = 73.3%, SD = 16.7%) and 
from 32% to 81% for the delayed test group (M = 51.5%, SD = 14.2%).  
Also, participants were significantly more certain of correctly 
recognized translations compared to false recognitions, 2(1, N = 41) = 471, 
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p < 0.001. Although there was no significant main effect of test delay on the 
certainty ratings, 2(1, N = 41) = 1.46, p = 0.23, there was a significant 
interaction between test delay and recognition accuracy, 2(1, N = 41) = 
26.1, p < 0.001. Follow-up tests revealed that whereas certainty about the 
false recognitions was not significantly different for the immediate and 
delayed test group, 2(1, N = 41) = 1.36, p = 0.24, certainty about correctly 
recognized translations was significantly higher in the immediate test group 
compared to the delayed test group, 2(1, N = 41) = 4.69, p = 0.030. In sum, 
the pattern of the recognition and certainty ratings across the immediate and 
delayed recognition test provides a full replication of the findings from our 
previous study. 
The effect of positive and negative RPEs. Next, we tested whether 
recognition performance was predicted by the number of options and the 
obtained reward in the acquisition task. Also, to test whether the recognition 
performance was again consistent with the SRPE account we compared the 
effect of positive RPEs (in rewarded trials) to that of negative RPEs (in 
unrewarded trials; see Figure 1b). 
Replicating our previous findings, the recognition rate significantly 
increased with an increasing number of options, 2(1, N = 41) = 24.0, p < 
0.001. Also, there was a significant main effect of obtained reward, 2(1, N = 
41) = 18.9, p < 0.001, with rewarded choices being remembered more 
accurately. There were no interactions with the test delay (all p > 0.30). Of 
importance for the comparison between positive and negative RPEs, there 
was a marginally significant interaction between the number of options and 
the obtained reward, 2(1, N = 41) = 3.44, p = 0.064. Although the effect of 
the number of options was thus remarkably different for rewarded and 
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unrewarded word pairs, there was still a marginally significant positive 
effect of the number of options in the unrewarded trials, 2(1, N = 41) = 
3.21, p = 0.073, as suggested in Figure 3a and 3c. In sum, these results again 
support the SRPE account and refute the URPE account for recognition in 
declarative learning, confirming our previous findings. 
A similar pattern of results was obtained for the certainty ratings. 
There was again a main effect of the number of options, 2(1, N = 41) = 
7.85, p = 0.0051, and an additional significant interaction between the 
number of options and the test delay, 2(1, N = 41) = 5.10, p = 0.024. 
Separate follow-up analyses on the data of the immediate and delayed test 
revealed that in the delayed test certainty ratings increased significantly with 
an increasing number of options, 2(1, N = 41) = 14.9, p < 0.001. However, 
in contrast to our previous study there was no significant effect in the 
certainty ratings of the immediate test, 2(1, N = 41) = 0.14, p = 0.71. Next, 
there was no replication of the main effect of reward, 2(1, N = 41) = 0.10, p 
= 0.75, but there was a significant interaction between reward and the test 
delay, 2(1, N = 41) = 6.72, p = 0.0095. Follow-up tests indicated that 
certainty ratings on the immediate test were higher for rewarded word pairs 
though the effect was marginally significant, 2(1, N = 41) = 3.19, p = 0.074, 
and this effect disappeared in the delayed test, 2(1, N = 41) = 2.52, p = 0.11. 
Interestingly, there was again no significant interaction between the number 
of options and reward, 2(1, N = 41) = 1.46, p = 0.23, confirming that the 
certainty ratings were in line with the SRPE account. All other interaction 
remained insignificant (all p > 0.10).  
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Figure 3: The recognition rate (y-axis) is plotted as a function of the number of 
options (x-axis) for the unrewarded (panel a) and rewarded word pairs (panel b) in 
the immediate test group and their equivalent in the delayed test (panels c and d). 
Note that in the one-option condition the chosen translation was always rewarded. 
Replicating our previous study, recognition increased significantly with an 
increasing number of options and reward (black regression line with gray 95% 
confidence band). Across the number of options, reward and delay, the average RT 
and 95% confidence interval was estimated and superimposed. Performance at 
chance level is indicated by the gray dashed line at 25% accuracy. 
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In sum, the analysis of the recognition accuracy fully replicates the 
findings from our previous study and supports the SRPE account for 
declarative learning. The same was true for the certainty ratings, although 
the differences between the immediate and delayed recognition test were 
more pronounced compared to the previous study. 
SRPEs as a linear predictor of declarative learning. In analogy to 
our previous study, we formally probed whether declarative memory 
performance increases linearly with SRPEs. Indeed, as Figure 4a and 4b 
illustrate, recognition improved linearly with increasing SRPEs. This 
relation was highly significant, 2(1, N = 41) = 24.5, p < 0.001. There was no 
significant interaction between SRPEs and delay, 2(1, N = 41) = 0.68, p = 
0.41. 
Concerning the effect of SRPEs on certainty ratings, the pattern of 
results found in the previous study was again more consistently replicated in 
the delayed test group compared to the immediate test group (Figure 4c and 
4d). As a consequence, there was no significant main effect of SRPEs on the 
certainty ratings, 2(1, N = 41) = 0.023, p = 0.88, but there was a significant 
interaction between the effect of SRPEs and delay, 2(1, N = 41) = 7.01, p = 
0.0081. Because in our previous study SRPEs predicted certainty ratings 
only for the correctly recognized word pairs in the immediate and delayed 
test, we performed a follow-up test to compare this effect across both test 
delays. These follow-up tests revealed that SRPEs had no significant effect 
on certainty ratings for the correctly recognized word pairs in the immediate 
test, 2(1, N = 20) = 1.15, p = 0.28, but resulted in significantly higher 
certainty ratings for correct recognitions in the delayed test, 2(1, N = 21) = 
3.90, p = 0.048. Thus, the linear effect of SRPEs on certainty ratings largely 
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replicates the pattern of findings from our previous study, mainly in the 
delayed test. 
So far, the behavioral data offer a replication of the previous study 
(chapter 3) and confirm that SRPEs predict declarative learning, with more 
pronounced effects on recognition after a one-day delay. To further validate 
these results, we will subsequently verify whether participants indeed 
experience a SRPE during the acquisition task. If such “better-than-
expected” signals are experienced, these SRPEs should be reflected by a 
modulation of the oscillatory power estimates (Cohen et al., 2007; 
HajiHosseini & Holroyd, 2015b; Oya et al., 2005). In addition, these power 
modulations during acquisition should predict the enhancement of the 
recognition performance. We will now turn to the analysis of the EEG data 
recorded during the acquisition task in order to test both predictions; and to 
pinpoint whether they only hold during the reward feedback phase or also 
extend into the word pair encoding phase (see Figure 1a). 
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Figure 4: The recognition (panel a and b; y-axis) and certainty ratings (panel c and 
d; y-axis) are plotted as a function of the SRPEs (x-axis) for the immediate and 
delayed test group. For the word pairs associated with each SRPE, the average 
recognition and certainty ratings and their 95% confidence intervals were estimated 
separately and superimposed. (a and b) Recognition increased significantly with 
higher SRPEs (black regression line with gray 95% confidence band). Performance 
at chance level is indicated by the gray dashed line at 25% accuracy. (c and d) 
SRPEs only predicted certainty ratings for correctly recognized word pairs (depicted 
in blue) in the delayed test (indicated with an asterisk), but not in the immediate test. 
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Oscillatory power modulations during acquisition reflect SRPEs  
To start, we examined the reflection of SRPEs in oscillatory power 
during reward feedback and word pair encoding. In analogy to the 
behavioral data analysis, we will first examine the separate modulating 
effects of the number of options and the obtained reward before proceeding 
to modulation by SRPEs. 
Oscillatory power modulated by number of options and obtained 
reward. During reward feedback, oscillatory power was modulated by the 
number of options and obtained reward in a number of partially overlapping 
clusters (see Figure 5a and 5b) as revealed by the cluster-based non-
parametric permutation test. A similar pair of partially overlapping clusters 
was found during word pair encoding (see Figure 6a and 6b). Because of the 
similarity of the clusters found in both phases of the acquisition task, they 
will jointly be discussed below. 
First, immediately after reward feedback onset a pair of overlapping 
clusters in the beta frequency band (12-30 Hz) showed increased power 
when fewer options were available (p = 0.000; see Figure 5a) and when 
positive reward feedback was received (p = 0.000; see Figure 5b). Of all the 
voxels in the beta cluster predicted by the number of options, 43.4% was 
represented in the beta cluster predicted by obtained reward. The reverse 
comparison revealed an overlap of 42.1%. These clusters extended over 
roughly 500 ms and were more pronounced over posterior electrodes 
although both had a broad topography. The combination of increased power 
in the beta band due to fewer options on the one hand and positive reward 
feedback on the other hand suggests that this beta band does not represent an 
SRPE. Indeed, SRPEs should be represented by either a simultaneous 
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positive effect of the number of options and reward, or alternatively a 
simultaneous negative effect of both predictors. Therefore, this initial beta 
cluster is not a likely representation of the experience of a SRPE (nor a 
URPE). A similar pair of overlapping clusters in the alpha/low-beta range 
(8-20 Hz) was found during word pair encoding. Like in the reward feedback 
phase, power estimates increased when fewer options were available (p = 
0.001; see Figure 6a) and when positive reward feedback was received (p = 
0.000; see Figure 6b). Thus, these clusters are highly reminiscent of the beta 
clusters observed during reward feedback (Figure 5a and 5b), mimicking 
their topography and their relation to the number of options and the obtained 
reward. Hence, the alpha/low-beta clusters found during word pair encoding 
are likewise no probable reflection of the experienced SRPEs. 
Second, the reward feedback evoked a positive cluster in the theta 
frequency band (4-8 Hz) with higher power as the number of options 
increased (p = 0.000; see Figure 5a). An overlapping but smaller negative 
cluster showed increased power in the theta band when error feedback was 
provided (p = 0.000; see Figure 5b). The small negative cluster showed an 
overlap of 88.7% with the large positive cluster. Both clusters peaked 
approximately 300 ms after feedback onset. The positive relation between 
the number of options and power estimates in the theta band was followed 
by a secondary cluster that demonstrated a reversed, negative relation (p = 
0.008; see Figure 5a). Taken together, activation in the theta cluster during 
reward feedback is mainly modulated by the number of options and not by 
the obtained reward. No such modulations in the theta frequency range were 
found during word pair encoding (see Figure 6). 
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Third, a cluster in the low-beta range (12-20 Hz) showed increased 
power estimates during error feedback (p = 0.000; see Figure 5b). The 
cluster extended from 500 ms to 1500 ms after feedback onset. No clear 
topography could be distilled from the channels represented in the cluster. 
Importantly, this cluster was uniquely related to the obtained reward as it 
showed no relation to the number of options during reward feedback (see 
Figure 5a). In addition, no equivalent cluster was found during word pair 
encoding (see Figure 6). 
In sum, the number of options and the obtained reward predicted 
oscillatory power modulations mainly during reward feedback and to a lesser 
extent during word pair encoding. During word pair encoding, the number of 
options and obtained reward only modulated oscillatory power in the 
alpha/low-beta band, though not likely reflecting the experience of a SRPE. 
During reward feedback, a similar modulation pattern was found in the beta 
band. This beta cluster was followed by a cluster in the theta band that was 
mainly modulated by the number of options, and a third modulation in the 
low-beta band specifically caused by the obtained reward. Thus, the separate 
effects of the number of options on the one hand and the obtained reward on 
the other hand are both reflected in the power modulations during the 
acquisition task. Taking these separate effects into account, we will now test 
whether SRPEs are likewise reflected during reward feedback and word pair 
encoding. 
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Figure 5: Oscillatory power during reward feedback is predicted by (a) the number 
of options and (b) the obtained reward. The significant positive (red) and negative 
(blue) clusters are plotted in the time-frequency domain, accompanied by their 
topographic representations (see p.109 for details). 
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Figure 6: Oscillatory power during word pair encoding is predicted by (a) the 
number of options and (b) the obtained reward. No further relations between 
oscillatory power and SRPEs or recognition performance were found in this phase. 
(For details on the graphical representation, see p. 109) 
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Oscillatory power modulated by SRPEs. The cluster-based non-
parametric permutation test on the relation between SRPEs and oscillatory 
power revealed no significant clusters during word pair encoding. 
Conversely, three significant clusters were found during reward feedback 
(see Figure 7) demonstrating that SRPEs were uniquely experienced when 
reward feedback was provided and not during the subsequent encoding 
phase. 
To start, the reward feedback evoked two clusters that highly resemble 
the theta and low-beta clusters described in the previous analysis (see 
above). A positive relation was found between SRPEs and power estimates 
in the theta band (p = 0.000; see Figure 7), again peaking at approximately 
300 ms. The relation in this theta cluster is likely based on the increased 
power estimates due to an increasing number of options, demonstrated in the 
analysis described above. Indeed, 52.5% of the voxels in the current theta 
cluster were also represented in the theta cluster in Figure 5a. Likewise, the 
increased low-beta power due to error feedback demonstrated in the previous 
analysis likely forms the basis for the negative relation between SRPEs and 
the current cluster of low-beta estimates (p = 0.000; see Figure 7), also 
peaking between 500 ms and 1000 ms after feedback onset. Half of the 
voxels in the current low-beta cluster were also present in the beta cluster 
predicted by the obtained reward (Figure 5b).  
Thus, although power oscillations in the theta range and low-beta 
range were both predicted by SRPEs these relations seem to rely on different 
underlying processes. To further demonstrate this point, we calculated the 
average power within each cluster on a trial-by-trial basis and attempted to 
predict activation in the low-beta band based on the activation in the theta 
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band by applying a linear mixed effects model with a random intercept 
across participants. This analysis clearly demonstrated the absence of a 
predictive relation between the activation in both clusters, 2(1, N = 41) = 
0.24, p = 0.63, further suggesting two different mechanisms. 
In contrast, there was a cluster in the high-beta range (20-30 Hz) 
showing a unique relation with SRPEs not previously found in the analyses 
with the number of options and obtained reward separately. The cluster also 
showed no overlap with any of the other clusters in the previous analyses. 
Oscillatory power in this high-beta cluster increased with increasing SRPEs 
(p = 0.008; see Figure 7), peaking around 500 ms post feedback onset. Its 
topography was relatively pronounced and showed a frontal mapping. In 
contrast to the absence of a predictive relation between activation in the theta 
and low-beta cluster, activation in the high-beta cluster was significantly 
predicted by the activation in the preceding theta cluster, 2(1, N = 41) = 
7.31, p = 0.0068, and in its turn predicted the power estimates in the 
subsequent low-beta cluster, 2(1, N = 41) = 12.22, p < 0.001.  
In sum, the high-beta cluster offers the main signature of the 
experienced SRPEs, not mainly accounted for by the separate effect of either 
the number of options or the obtained reward. Thus the clustering analysis 
confirms that participants experienced “better-than-expected” signals during 
the acquisition task, further supporting our claim that SRPEs drive 
declarative learning. This relation was uniquely found during reward 
feedback and did not extend into the word pair encoding phase. 
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Figure 7: The oscillatory power during reward feedback reveals a positive relation 
with SRPEs in the theta range (peaking at 300 ms post feedback onset) and a 
negative relation with SRPEs in the low-beta range (peaking between 500 ms and 
1000 ms post feedback onset). In addition, increasing SRPEs cause increased power 
in the high-beta range, peaking at 500 ms post feedback onset. (For details on the 
graphical representation, see p. 109) 
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Recognition performance predicted by oscillatory power  
So far we have demonstrated that SRPEs are indeed reflected in the 
modulation of oscillatory power during reward feedback. Next, we probed 
whether power modulations during the acquisition task could predict 
recognition accuracy in the subsequent recognition test. The cluster-based 
non-parametric permutation test revealed no significant clusters, indicating 
that variations in oscillatory power during acquisition could not predict 
subsequent recognition accuracy. This was true in the reward feedback phase 
and during word pair encoding. 
However, the recognition accuracy might not yield the most sensitive 
performance measure because of its dichotomous nature and because of its 
likely contamination by correct guesses (i.e., a 25% chance of guessing the 
correct translation). Therefore, in line with previous studies that 
demonstrated a link between electrophysiological activity during acquisition 
and subsequent confidence ratings (Johnson, 1995; Otten & Rugg, 2001; 
Sommer, Komoss, & Schweinberger, 1997), we also tested whether 
oscillatory power during reward feedback could predict the certainty ratings 
for the correctly recognized word pairs. We thus probed whether the pattern 
in the behavioral analysis (i.e., a significant effect of SRPEs on the certainty 
rating for the correctly recognized word pairs in the delayed test group; see 
Figure 4d) would be reflected by the power estimates. Indeed, in the delayed 
test group there was a large significant cluster in the alpha band (8-12 Hz) 
that predicted certainty ratings for correctly recognized word pairs (p = 
0.000; see Figure 8). More specifically, suppressed power in the alpha band 
during reward feedback resulted in higher certainty ratings. This alpha 
cluster extended from 500 ms to 1700 ms post feedback onset and had a 
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midline topography. The predictive relation between oscillatory power and 
certainty ratings was specific for the correctly recognized word pairs in the 
delayed test group (p > 0.26 for all other comparisons involving the 
immediate test group and/or the false recognitions), mirroring the specificity 
of the relation between SRPEs and certainty ratings in the behavioral 
analysis. 
Next, we probed the relation between the alpha band cluster predictive 
for recognition performance and the clusters related to the experience of 
SRPEs (see above). Confirming the overlap suggested on Figure 7 and 
Figure 8, 15.4% of the voxels in the current alpha cluster were also 
represented in the low-beta cluster predicted by SRPEs. In addition, activity 
in the alpha cluster was predicted by activation in the low-beta cluster 
(excluding overlapping voxels), 2(1, N = 20) = 376, p < 0.001, and activity 
in the upper-beta cluster, 2(1, N = 20) = 5.45, p = 0.020, but not by that in 
the theta cluster, 2(1, N = 20) = 0.0054, p = 0.94. Thus, these results 
confirm that the current alpha cluster predictive for memory performance 
(see Figure 8) and the clusters related to the experience of SRPEs (see Figure 
7) show a partial overlap and are functionally related. 
Finally, we probed whether the certainty ratings were uniquely 
predicted by power modulations during reward feedback or whether they 
were also influenced by activity in the subsequent word pair encoding phase. 
Therefore, we repeated the same tests outlined above on the power estimates 
during word pair encoding, but no significant clusters were found (all p > 
0.09).  
In sum, power estimates during reward feedback are predictive for 
certainty ratings, but only when declarative memory is probed after a one-
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day delay. The alpha band cluster predictive for these certainty ratings 
overlaps partially with the low-beta cluster (Figure 7) and its activity is 
predicted by both this low-beta cluster and the high-beta cluster that reflect 
the experience of SRPEs. Thus, there is a clear link between power 
oscillations during reward feedback and both the experience of SRPEs and 
the resulting enhancement of declarative learning. 
 
Figure 8: The certainty rating for correctly recognized word pairs in the delayed test 
group are predicted by oscillatory power during reward feedback. Lower alpha 
suppression (peaking from 500 ms to 1700 ms post feedback onset) was predictive 
for higher certainty ratings. (For details on the graphical representation, see p. 109) 
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DISCUSSION 
The current experiment offers a full replication of the behavioral 
results from the previous study (chapter 3) and confirms that SRPEs drive 
declarative learning. Word pairs associated with large, positive RPEs were 
recognized more often and with higher certainty. Also, this effect grew 
stronger after a one-day delay as predicted by the neoHebbian learning 
account (Lisman et al., 2011). As a further validation of the beneficial effect 
of SRPEs on declarative learning, we showed that participants actually 
experience these “better-than-expected” signals by uncovering their 
modulating effect on the oscillatory power in the theta, high-beta and low-
beta frequency band. Furthermore, a partially overlapping and functionally 
related cluster of activation in the alpha band was predictive for the 
recognition performance after a one-day delay, mirroring the pattern of 
findings in the behavioral analysis. Thus, the results from the EEG analysis 
confirm the experience of SRPEs and elucidate how these teaching signals 
influence declarative learning. The EEG analysis also revealed that both 
effects were uniquely found during reward feedback and did not extend into 
the ensuing word pair encoding phase.  
Overall, our results nicely tie in with established findings on the role 
of RPEs in procedural learning and bridge the gap with the literature on 
declarative learning. First, our findings demonstrate that the same reward 
mechanism involved in procedural learning is also activated by SRPEs 
during declarative learning. Second, the current experiment makes a timely 
contribution to a recent line of research on how neural activity prior to 
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encoding can influence declarative learning. Each of these points will be 
further unpacked below. 
RPEs modulate oscillatory power and influence both procedural and 
declarative learning 
The current results uncover the involvement of the classical RPE 
mechanisms typically found in procedural learning. In line with previous 
research we found activation in the theta, high-beta and low-beta band. This 
pattern of results echoes how RPEs are traditionally reflected in power 
oscillations during procedural learning, where they serve as a teaching 
signal.  
First, SRPEs were reflected by a power increase in the theta band (4-8 
Hz) during reward feedback, even if this relation was mainly driven by the 
number of options. Activation in the theta band has been associated with 
event-related potentials such as the feedback related negativity (FRN), as 
well as other components such as the error related negativity (ERN) and the 
correct related negativity (CRN). All of these components signal an 
evaluation of the (reward) feedback based on prior knowledge and current 
predictions (Cavanagh, Cohen, & Allen, 2009; Gehring, Liu, Orr, & Carp, 
2012; Luu, Tucker, & Makeig, 2004; Oliveira, McDonald, & Goodman, 
2007; Yordanova, Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, & Kolev, 2004). The source of 
these theta oscillations has been ascribed to the medial prefrontal cortex and 
the anterior cingulate cortex (Cavanagh, Figueroa, Cohen, & Frank, 2011; 
Cohen, Elger, & Fell, 2009; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Luu et al., 2004) where 
they have been suggested to drive several adaptive processes such as 
cognitive control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; 
Cavanagh & Frank, 2014; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 
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2004). Interestingly, because the hippocampal area is also dominated by 
theta oscillations, learning has been hinted at as one of these adaptive 
processes triggered by RPEs (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014). Indeed, based on 
the reinforcement learning account for the FRN (Cavanagh, Frank, Klein, & 
Allen, 2010; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Krigolson, 
2008; Silvetti, Seurinck, & Verguts, 2011), the theta oscillations have been 
hypothesized to function as a teaching signal and to reflect increased activity 
in the mesolimbic dopamine system. This complex interaction between the 
dopaminergic system and the theta oscillations in the prefrontal area and 
hippocampus (Fujisawa & Buzsáki, 2011) distinctively relates to the 
neoHebbian learning framework put forward in the introduction (Lisman et 
al., 2011). 
Second, SRPEs were also reflected in the high- and low-beta 
frequency band during reward feedback. Although (U)RPEs have 
predominantly been related to activation in the theta band, activation in the 
beta band has been implicated in the thalamic network that regulates 
memory formation based on prefrontal teaching signals (Ketz, Jensen, 
O’Reilly, & O’Reilly, 2015). According to this thalamic coordination 
account, the theta oscillations regulate episodic-like (declarative) memory, 
while the beta oscillations are predictive for familiarity-based recognition. 
This dissociation between the role of oscillatory activity in the theta and beta 
band might inform why in the current experiment oscillatory power in the 
beta band – but critically not the theta band – was predictive for the 
recognition performance. However, further research is necessary to elucidate 
whether both frequency bands have a distinctive influence on recall and 
recognition (Ketz et al., 2015; Merkow, Burke, Stein, & Kahana, 2014). 
Interestingly, our study not only revealed the predicted negative relation 
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between SRPEs and power in the low-beta band (12-20 Hz; Ketz et al., 
2015; Oya et al., 2005), it also revealed a positive relation with power in the 
high-beta band (20-30 Hz). RPEs have indeed been shown to evoke a power 
increase in the high-beta band (HajiHosseini & Holroyd, 2015a). These 
power modulations were source-localized to the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, in keeping with the frontal topography of the high-beta cluster in the 
current experiment. In their procedural learning experiment, HajiHosseini 
and Holroyd (2015b) also probed whether activity in the high-beta band 
varied with reward valence and reward probability. Across separate blocks, 
reward probabilities were manipulated through a staircase procedure that 
determined the width of a response window resulting in either a 75% chance 
of positive feedback or a 75% chance of error feedback. However, counter to 
the current results, only the reward valence but not the distinct reward 
probabilities had a detectable influence on the oscillatory power estimates. It 
is unclear why the high-beta activity in the current experiment does reflect 
the reward probability, but we might speculate that the manipulation of the 
reward probability was more salient and task-relevant in the current study 
(i.e., varied on a trial-by-trial basis by choosing among one, two or four 
Swahili words).  
On the whole, the current results established that the parametrically 
manipulated SRPEs that drive declarative learning indeed activate the same 
dopaminergic reward system that has been demonstrated to drive procedural 
learning. Next, we will turn to the implications of the current findings for the 
literature on declarative learning. 
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Oscillatory power prior to encoding is predictive for declarative 
learning 
Recently, there has been a surge of interest in the contribution that 
reward mechanisms make to declarative learning (Hidi, 2016; Howard-Jones 
& Jay, 2016; Miendlarzewska, Bavelier, & Schwartz, 2016), with the goal of 
merging the gap between neuroscientific research on reinforcement learning 
and its application in everyday settings such as in education. This revived 
interest offers a fresh perspective on declarative learning as historically most 
research in this field has focused on neural activity during retrieval instead 
of during encoding (Wilding & Ranganath, 2011). In addition, studies that 
focused on encoding have largely been limited to the difference due to 
memory effect (Paller, 1990) and the subsequent memory effect (Paller & 
Wagner, 2002). In these paradigms, spontaneous variations in neural activity 
during encoding are retrospectively contrasted between subsequently 
recalled and forgotten items. Using electrophysiological recordings, 
oscillations in the theta frequency band have been shown to predict 
subsequent memory performance (Kleberg, Kitajo, Kawasaki, & 
Yamaguchi, 2014) and these oscillations have been ascribed to a network 
involving the prefrontal cortex and the hippocampal area (Cohen et al., 2015; 
Hsieh & Ranganath, 2014; Lisman & Jensen, 2013; Nyhus & Curran, 2010). 
A number of intracranial EEG studies have recently validated this claim by 
demonstrating how prefrontal and hippocampal theta oscillations – along 
with subsequent modulations in the alpha band – predicted successful 
memory encoding (Fell et al., 2011; Greenberg, Burke, Haque, Kahana, & 
Zaghloul, 2015; Haque, Wittig, Damera, Inati, & Zaghloul, 2015; Merkow et 
al., 2014; Sweeney-Reed et al., 2016).  
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Overall, these results are in line with the involvement of theta 
oscillations in procedural learning (see above) and the neoHebbian learning 
account (Lisman et al., 2011). However, because these studies are based on 
spontaneous neural activity it is hard to exclude alternative interpretations 
such as attentional processes and resource allocation (Wilding & Ranganath, 
2011). In order to test whether oscillatory power variations are causally 
related to subsequent memory improvement, a number of studies have tried 
to directly manipulate oscillatory power prior to encoding. To start, 
converging evidence from fMRI (Bollinger, Rubens, Zanto, & Gazzaley, 
2010; Galli, Bauch, & Gruber, 2011; Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014; 
Loh et al., 2015) MEG (Garrido, Barnes, Kumaran, Maguire, & Dolan, 
2015) and behavioral experiments (Liu, Grady, & Moscovitch, 2016; Otten, 
Quayle, Akram, Ditewig, & Rugg, 2006; Oyarzún, Packard, de Diego-
Balaguer, & Fuentemilla, 2016) support the claim that prior knowledge and 
reward expectations are the actual driver of improved declarative learning. 
This was further confirmed in an EEG study, showing that reward 
expectations boost declarative learning through anticipatory theta activity 
over frontal regions (Gruber, Watrous, Ekstrom, Ranganath, & Otten, 2013). 
Interestingly, Gruber and colleagues only found this effect during the 
anticipation of large positive rewards, in accordance with the findings from 
the current study. It is likely that reward anticipation and SRPEs evoke 
similar power bursts in the theta band and increased dopaminergic activity 
that subsequently causes enhanced recognition performance. 
On an important note, the current study only provided support for a 
direct relation between activity in the alpha cluster and subsequent 
recognition performance. Therefore, we need to take into account that the 
observed clusters in the theta, high-beta and low-beta band were only 
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indirectly related to memory performance through their functional relation 
with activity in the alpha cluster. This sparks the intriguing question whether 
SRPEs have a direct impact on declarative learning or whether they 
influence encoding indirectly by triggering other adaptive processes. Indeed, 
not only activation in the theta band but also activation in the beta and alpha 
band has been shown to improve declarative learning. For example, alpha 
oscillations have been associated with enhanced semantic encoding 
(Klimesch, 1999) and with the gating of relevant items and suppression of 
irrelevant information (Ketz et al., 2015; Park et al., 2014). In the current 
study, the increased alpha activity on unrewarded trials (i.e., during negative 
RPEs) might thus reflect the suppression of the incorrectly guessed 
translation in anticipation of the correct translation. Next to the alpha 
activity, spontaneous activation in the beta band has also been shown to be 
predictive for successful encoding, both in a surprise recall test (Salari & 
Rose, 2016) as well as during intentional encoding (Schneider & Rose, 
2016). Still, the pattern of findings is highly variable across studies, 
especially when the analyses are based on spontaneous power fluctuations 
and various behavioral tasks. Also, the inconsistent pattern of findings across 
studies might be caused by insufficient statistical power (i.e., due to the low 
number of trials in declarative learning paradigms) or because of the variety 
of memory test used (e.g., planned or surprise recall, recognition accuracy 
and recognition certainty). By the parametric manipulation of RPEs, the 
current study provides a useful paradigm to help disentangle the involvement 
of several adaptive mechanisms that enhance declarative recall and 
recognition. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the current experiment we replicated the beneficial effect of SRPEs 
on declarative learning found in our previous study (chapter 3). During 
reward feedback, SRPEs were shown to modulate oscillatory power in the 
theta, high-beta and low-beta band; SRPEs thus triggered the same reward 
mechanisms also activated by RPEs in procedural learning paradigms. Also 
during reward feedback, activity in the alpha band was predictive for the 
recognition performance after a one-day delay. Together, these findings 
provide the first empirical demonstration of how SRPEs can enhance 
declarative memory and make a timely contribution to the application of 
insights from reinforcement learning to the field of declarative learning. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this dissertation we have set out to investigate how prediction errors 
(PEs) influence perception and learning. Indeed, the prediction of upcoming 
events offers a double adaptive advantage. First, predictions facilitate 
perception on the short term, for instance by prioritizing what information 
enters our visual awareness. They thus determine the speed and accuracy 
with which matching and mismatching information is detected. Second, PEs 
serve as a teaching signal, allowing us to perfect our predictive model of the 
world on the long term. More specifically, reward prediction errors (RPEs) 
prioritize what information will be remembered and what information will 
likely be forgotten.  
Overall, the goal of this dissertation was to apply a systems approach 
to get a deeper insight into the mechanisms by which PEs influence 
perception and learning. In order to do so we drew upon formal models from 
perceptual decision making studies and the reinforcement learning literature, 
respectively. First, we investigated by what mechanism visual awareness is 
influenced by PEs. By applying a drift diffusion model (DDM; Ratcliff, 
1985) to a cued individuation task, we demonstrated that PEs influence 
visual awareness by modulating the threshold setting (but importantly not 
the processing efficiency). Second, we verified whether RPEs not only drive 
procedural learning but also enhance declarative learning. In a declarative 
learning paradigm, we therefore manipulated the size of positive and 
negative RPEs experienced during word pair encoding. The RPEs were 
quantified based on the reinforcement learning models typically used in the 
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literature on procedural learning. In addition, we probed memory 
performance in an immediate and delayed recognition test in order to verify 
whether the effect of RPEs on declarative learning became more evident 
over time as predicted by the neoHebbian learning framework (Lisman, 
Grace, & Duzel, 2011). Overall, the results of the behavioral and EEG 
experiment demonstrate that increasingly positive RPEs lead to enhanced 
declarative learning. In line with the neoHebbian account, this effect was 
more pronounced in the delayed test compared to the immediate test. 
Attesting the validity of our findings, the results from the time-frequency 
analysis further showed that experiencing these RPEs evokes the same 
neural response as typically observed for RPE during procedural learning. 
Also, oscillatory power during reward feedback was predictive for the 
recognition performance. 
Below, we will unpack the implications of the current results for the 
literature on visual awareness and declarative learning. Also, we will discuss 
future perspectives on how our approach can further deepen our 
understanding of the underlying cognitive mechanisms. 
THE SHORT TERM EFFECT OF PRIOR INFORMATION ON VISUAL 
AWARENESS 
In chapter 2 we investigated the short term effect of PEs on 
perception. More specifically, we aimed to clarify how PEs influence 
stimulus individuation, a process involving the spatial tagging of an object 
irrespective of its identity (Leslie, Xu, Tremoulet, & Scholl, 1998; Xu, 
2009). In an individuation task, participants were therefore asked to locate a 
picture above or below fixation. At the start of each trial, an icon appeared 
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which was congruent, incongruent or neutral with respect to the identity of 
the ensuing picture (i.e., a house or a face). Thus, participants were provided 
with prior information about the identity of the upcoming stimulus, without 
creating a bias toward the correct response on the individuation task (i.e., 
locating the picture above or below fixation). The results indicated that PEs 
(i.e., caused by incongruent icons) significantly delayed stimulus 
individuation but had no influence on individuation accuracy. 
In order to clarify by what mechanism PEs influence visual 
awareness, we applied a drift diffusion model (DDM; Ratcliff & Rouder, 
1998; Ratcliff, 1985) to the individuation task. This allowed us to 
disentangle whether PEs delayed individuation by altering either the speed 
of the evidence accumulation (i.e., the processing efficiency) or by 
modulating the amount of evidence accumulation needed before the location 
of a stimulus is detected (i.e., the threshold setting). The results revealed that 
PEs influence individuation by increasing the threshold setting. Importantly, 
the PE manipulation had no influence on the processing efficiency. 
Next we will discuss how our results feed into the ongoing debate in 
the consciousness literature on the role of prior information in early (visual) 
awareness. We will also provide some practical pointers on the use of formal 
models such as the DDM in future research on the mechanisms by which 
prior information influences visual awareness. 
Using the DDM to investigate visual awareness 
With this experiment we provide the first formal test on how prior 
information influences individuation by differentiating between its effect on 
the threshold setting and the processing efficiency. Although diffusion 
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models have already been deployed to investigate the effect of prior 
information in identification tasks (for a review, see Mulder, van Maanen, & 
Forstmann, 2014; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014), this was the first study to 
apply a DDM to an individuation task. As discussed in chapter 2, this is an 
important step forward as individuation is a typical measure for visual 
awareness in the consciousness literature (Baars, 1994; Sergent & Dehaene, 
2004; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). 
Using the DDM to investigate the role of prior information in visual 
awareness makes a timely contribution to the consciousness literature. 
Indeed, there is currently a great interest in the role that prior information 
plays in consciousness. Traditionally, conscious awareness has been 
characterized as a limited capacity system, accommodating only a select set 
of items (Baars, 1994; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). In order to reach 
consciousness, concurrent items are hypothesized to compete for access to 
consciousness. This competition model has brought about a number of 
attempts to determine why certain stimuli will receive prioritized access to 
conscious perception while others are excluded. 
In one such line of research, we previously started to explore how the 
overlap between consciousness and working memory influences the 
threshold for visual awareness. In a first study, we demonstrated how 
increasing working memory load increases the threshold for visual 
awareness (De Loof, Verguts, Fias, & Van Opstal, 2013). Next, we also 
probed how different types of working memory load had distinct effects on 
the detectability of masked stimuli (De Loof, Poppe, Cleeremans, Gevers, & 
Van Opstal, 2015). Other studies have also demonstrated similar interactions 
between working memory and visual awareness (Gayet, Paffen, & Van der 
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Stigchel, 2013; Lupyan & Ward, 2013; Pan, Lin, Zhao, & Soto, 2014; Pinto, 
van Gaal, de Lange, Lamme, & Seth, 2015). Interestingly, some of these 
studies have probed the influence of the contents of working memory on 
conscious perception. Using a wide variety of stimuli and tasks, these studies 
indicated that stimuli that match the content of working memory typically 
reach awareness faster than mismatching items. These results are in line with 
the current findings and indicate that prior information on the upcoming 
stimulus facilitates the detection of related information. 
However, there are a number of studies that suggest that unexpected 
information reaches visual awareness faster, such as pictures depicting 
incongruent scenes (e.g., a woman placing a chess board in the oven; 
Mudrik, Breska, Lamy, & Deouell, 2011) or sentences containing semantic 
errors (Sklar et al., 2012). This has given rise to an ongoing debate in the 
literature on the extent to which prior information can influence visual 
awareness or whether these top-down effects are the result of confounds in 
the experimental design (Gayet, Van der Stigchel, & Paffen, 2014). 
Recently, Firestone and Scholl (2015) have given a detailed overview of the 
pitfalls that can occur when testing the effect of top-down expectations on 
visual awareness, such as the creation of a response bias or the unclear 
distinction between perception and judgment. 
With the DDM we offer a fresh approach to this ongoing debate. First, 
in addition to determining whether prior information will facilitate or delay 
visual awareness for matching and mismatching stimuli, it could be useful to 
map these effects onto their underlying mechanisms to differentiate between 
seemingly contradictory findings. Second, using diffusion models also 
provides a direct link with the established literature on the effect of prior 
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information on more general visual processing (Summerfield & de Lange, 
2014; Summerfield & Egner, 2009). Third, because of the link between the 
model parameters and their neural substrate, augmenting future studies with 
a formal framework such as the DDM might add to the call for a deeper 
understanding of the influence of prior information on visual awareness 
(O’Callaghan, Kveraga, Shine, Adams, & Bar, 2016) and the first steps 
recently taking in that direction (e.g. using MEG; Aru, Rutiku, Wibral, & 
Singer, 2016). 
Practical pointers for the use of diffusion models in research on visual 
awareness 
Below we will briefly discuss some practical insights gleaned from 
applying the DDM to classical paradigms used to measure visual awareness. 
A necessary adaptation to many classical visual awareness paradigms 
(e.g., continuous flash suppression and backward masking) will likely be to 
increase the number of error trials. That is to say, one of the potential 
drawbacks of the DDM is its reliance on a separate reaction time (RT) 
distribution for the correct trials as well as the error trials. This necessitates a 
sufficient number of error trials in order to reliably fit their RT distribution. 
In an earlier version of the experiment reported in chapter 2, we were unable 
to reliably fit the DDM due to a low number of error trials. To test the 
reliability of the parameter estimates, a randomization test was performed by 
pairing the RTs to the accuracy data in random order. By performing this 
randomization test on the parameter estimates, we found that the difference 
between the estimates across the conditions was a mere byproduct of the low 
number of error trials. More specifically, the low error rate had a particularly 
distorting effect on the parameter estimates for the incongruent condition 
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because of the low total number of incongruent trials in the design (i.e., only 
20% of the trials). Thus, because the low error rate distorted the parameter 
estimates more for the incongruent condition compared to the congruent 
condition, a spurious difference between conditions was created. 
A first possible solution to overcome a modest or insufficient number 
of error trials is to use a hierarchical form of the DDM. The hierarchical 
DDM (HDDM; Wiecki, Sofer, & Frank, 2013) allows to estimate the various 
parameters of the model across all participants instead of on an individual 
basis, as is the case in the traditional DDM. This reduces the detrimental 
effect of a low number of error trials in a subset of participants. Still, in line 
with the validations test performed in chapter 2, a thorough test of the model 
assumptions and possible confounds remains imperative.  
In cases where the number of errors is extremely low (as was the case 
in our earlier version of the experiment), the hierarchical model might still 
not suffice to solve the problem. As a second solution we therefore added the 
staircase procedure to the masked priming paradigm (see page 41 for a 
description). This staircase procedure guaranteed a sufficiently high error 
rate for each participant. Applying the randomization test to the data 
reported in chapter 2 indeed demonstrated that the number of errors was 
sufficiently high in order to yield reliable parameter estimates.  
A similar attempt to increase the number of error trials was made 
when applying the staircase procedure to the continuous flash suppression 
paradigm (CFS; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). During CFS, participants are 
presented with a continuous stream of colorful flashes to the one eye and a 
stationary image to the other eye. This causes a sustained suppression of the 
stationary image by the colorfull flashes, with the stationary image only 
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breaking through this suppression after several seconds or even minutes. By 
reducing the visibility of the stationary image (i.e., by increasing its 
transparacy) we tried to evoke more detection errors. However, after 
multiple attempts we failed to warrant a sufficiently high level of error trials. 
Probably the attempts failed because the CFS paradigm lacks a clear speed-
accuracy trade-off. That is, participants are asked to detect the stimulus as 
fast as possible but there is no response deadline. Also, because the RT 
distribution is characterized by a high variance and many extremely high 
RTs, there is no clear sense of an internal response deadline. Additional 
adaptations to the paradigm will thus be necessary before a diffusion model 
can be fitted to the CFS paradigm and related paradigms that lack a clear 
speed-accuracy trade-off. Overall, this case illustrates that any visual 
awareness paradigm will have to be tailored to the requirements of the 
applied diffusion model before it can be used to differentiate by what 
mechanisms prior information influences visual awareness. 
THE LONG TERM EFFECT OF “BETTER-THAN-EXPECTED” SIGNALS ON 
DECLARATIVE LEARNING 
After establishing how PEs influence visual awareness, we next 
probed how PEs guide behavior on the long term through their impact on 
learning. In the introduction of this dissertation, we discussed how the 
anticipation of reward and the ensuing reward prediction errors (RPEs; 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Sutton & Barto, 1998) play a crucial role in 
learning. Ample empirical evidence confirms that RPEs are signaled through 
dopamine release in the substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area, 
triggering a dopaminergic pathway with wide projections to cortical and 
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subcortical structures (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; Eshel et al., 2015; 
Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). 
In addition, a wide range of models have detailed the way in which the 
reward value of upcoming events is anticipated and evaluated (e.g. the 
reward value and prediction model; Silvetti, Seurinck, & Verguts, 2011) and 
how RPEs function as a teaching signal during procedural learning (Holroyd 
& Coles, 2002; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Sutton & Barto, 1998).  
Interestingly, although the effect of RPEs has been firmly established 
and validated in research on procedural learning, empirical evidence for the 
impact of RPEs on declarative learning remains surprisingly absent (Squire, 
2004). Importantly, a similar effect of RPEs on declarative learning could be 
expected based on the role of dopamine bursts in hippocampal long-term 
potentiation (LTP). According to the neoHebbian learning account (Lisman 
et al., 2011), dopamine bursts tag information that is concurrently encoded in 
the hippocampus, causing enhanced late LTP for these tagged memory 
traces. Thus, because RPEs trigger activation in a dopaminergic pathway 
with projections to the hippocampus, they likely enhance declarative 
learning. Also, because dopamine is hypothesized to enhance late LTP, the 
impact of RPEs on declarative memory should become more apparent on a 
delayed test (e.g. after a delay of a day or a week) compared to an immediate 
test (e.g., after twenty minutes). 
To test this hypothesis and fill this gap between the literature on 
procedural and declarative learning, we constructed a declarative learning 
paradigm in which RPEs were coupled to the acquisition of Dutch-Swahili 
word pairs. Based on the reinforcement learning literature, we quantified the 
RPEs as the difference between the obtained reward and the reward 
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expectancy (Bush & Mosteller, 1951a, 1951b; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; 
Sutton & Barto, 1998). The reward expectancy was manipulated by letting 
participants guess among one, two or four Swahili words for each Dutch 
word. In addition, the obtained reward was manipulated by rewarding the 
correct guesses and giving no reward for incorrect guesses. Thus, 
participants experienced RPEs of various quantifiable sizes before the 
correct word pair was presented. Participants were encouraged to memorize 
these word pairs for a recognition test that they performed either 
immediately or after a one-day delay. 
The results reported in chapter 3 indeed demonstrate that word pairs 
that were coupled to large, positive RPEs during encoding were 
subsequently recognized with significantly higher accuracy and certainty. 
Thus, declarative learning was boosted by “better-than-expected” teaching 
signals (i.e., signed reward prediction errors; SRPEs). The experiment 
provided an internal replication of the results, as the SRPEs predicted 
memory performance in the immediate test group as well as the delayed test 
group. Interestingly, the effect of SRPEs on recognition performance was 
even stronger after a one-day delay, although this between-subjects 
comparison failed to reach significance. In addition, we ruled out alternative 
explanations such as the time-on-task account (Hebb, 1949): longer 
deliberation on the possible translations had no effect on the subsequent 
memory performance.  
Thus, the current experiment provides the first empirical 
demonstration of how RPEs influence declarative learning in humans. In 
order to further validate our findings, we performed a follow-up EEG study 
(reported in chapter 4). Apart from providing a replication of our previous 
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results (chapter 3), the first aim of this study was to test whether our 
quantification of SRPEs could actually account for the neural response to the 
reward feedback. If so, oscillatory power during reward feedback should be 
significantly modulated by the SRPEs. Second, we also tested whether 
SRPEs had a direct effect on declarative learning or whether they influenced 
learning indirectly (e.g., by increasing attention during encoding; 
Ridderinkhof, Van Den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004). Therefore, 
we tested whether SRPEs predicted oscillatory power only during reward 
feedback or also during word pair encoding. In addition, we also probed 
whether oscillatory power modulations during reward feedback and word 
pair encoding were predictive for the subsequent recognition performance.  
The results of the follow-up EEG study presented in chapter 4 
confirmed the findings from our previous study. SRPEs significantly 
predicted declarative learning and this effect was again more pronounced 
when recognition was probed after a one-day delay. The time-frequency 
analysis on the EEG data additionally allowed us to validate the neural 
underpinning we proposed for our findings. First, we confirmed that SRPEs 
significantly predict the oscillatory power in the theta, high-beta and low-
beta frequency band. Importantly, this modulating effect of SRPEs on power 
estimates was only found during reward feedback and did not extend into the 
word pair encoding phase. These results suggest that participants actually 
experience a “better-than-expected” signal during reward feedback. Also, the 
SRPEs evoked by our reward manipulation activated RPE mechanisms 
similar to those found during procedural learning (Cavanagh, Cohen, & 
Allen, 2009; Gehring, Liu, Orr, & Carp, 2012; Luu, Tucker, & Makeig, 
2004; Oliveira, McDonald, & Goodman, 2007; Yordanova, Falkenstein, 
Hohnsbein, & Kolev, 2004). Second, we probed whether SRPEs had a direct 
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influence on declarative memory or whether their influence was more 
indirect, for instance through increased attention during word pair encoding. 
The results showed that recognition performance was not significantly 
predicted by oscillatory power during word pair encoding. However, power 
oscillations in the alpha band during reward feedback did predict the 
certainty of the subsequently recognized word pairs, but only when the 
recognition test was performed after a one-day delay.  
Taken together, the results summarized above provide the first 
empirical evidence demonstrating that SRPEs reliably boost declarative 
learning. In line with the neoHebbian learning account (Lisman et al., 2011), 
the effect was more prominent on a delayed test. Also, we confirmed that 
participants actually experience SRPEs during reward feedback. Our results 
further suggest that SRPEs have a direct effect on declarative learning, and 
provide no evidence for an indirect effect through increased attention during 
word pair encoding. These results make a timely contribution to the 
literature on declarative learning in light of the recent debate on the 
application of reward mechanisms in educational settings (Hidi, 2016; 
Howard-Jones & Jay, 2016; Miendlarzewska, Bavelier, & Schwartz, 2016). 
Next, we will review what questions remain unanswered and how our 
current paradigm might provide a useful tool for future research.  
Reliability and generalizability of the current paradigm 
The reliability and replicability of our research findings deserves 
special attention as many studies on declarative learning suffer from low 
statistical power. That is, sample sizes are usually very low as a participant 
can only learn that many stimuli in a traditional one-hour experiment. Thus, 
studies often report on the results of paradigms that consist of as few as 48 
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learned items (Carpenter, 2009). This makes research in declarative learning 
significantly more challenging compared to procedural learning paradigms. 
To counter this potential pitfall, a number of initiatives are being taken to 
conduct large scale studies in educational settings and through (online) 
educational learning games (for a discussion, see Howard-Jones & Jay, 
2016). However, these large scale studies are rare as they require a 
coordinated, multidisciplinary approach. In the current paradigm (with 60 
trials per participant), we alternatively support the reliability of our findings 
by performing multiple replications. More precisely, SRPEs were a 
significant predictor for the recognition accuracies in the immediate and 
delayed group in both the behavioral and EEG experiment. Thus, the results 
were reliably replicated across four separate test groups, each consisting of 
approximately twenty participants. 
However, the current EEG study might still suffer from low statistical 
power when relating the trial-by-trial power estimates with the recognition 
performance. Although both the oscillatory power and the recognition 
accuracy were significantly predicted by the SRPEs, there was no direct 
relation between trial-by-trial power and the recognition accuracy. The 
absence of this relation has many possible causes. First, the relation between 
the SRPEs and the power estimates might be easier to detect, as the SRPEs 
were precisely calculated. In contrast, the recognition accuracies only 
provide a dichotomized measure of the memory performance, and are likely 
contaminated with correct guesses as participants had a 25% chance of 
selecting the correct answer in the recognition test. Second, the SRPEs are 
directly and immediately evoked by the reward feedback, whereas the 
oscillatory power fluctuations related to enhanced encoding cannot be time-
locked as accurately. Third, the trial-by-trial oscillatory power measured at 
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the scalp likely results in rather noisy estimates. In a paradigm with only 60 
trials per participant, the combination of these factors might have resulted in 
a type II error. By comparison, 160 and 240 stimuli were used in two 
comparable studies (i.e., studies with a similar number of subjects that also 
related oscillatory power during encoding with the subsequency recognition 
accuracy; Gruber, Watrous, Ekstrom, Ranganath, & Otten, 2013; Kleberg, 
Kitajo, Kawasaki, & Yamaguchi, 2014). In future experiments we should 
therefore take care to increase the statistical power by increasing the number 
of participants, the number of trials or the sensitivity of the memory test.  
Concerning the generalizability of the current findings, we considered 
whether the pattern of results might be tightly linked to the memorization 
instructions and the recognition test. First, one might wonder whether RPEs 
have an equal influence on intentional and incidental encoding. In the 
current paradigm, participants were clearly instructed to memorize the word 
pairs for the recognition test so the encoding was intentional. However, 
Lisman and colleagues (2011) point out that reward anticipation has been 
demonstrated to enhance learning during both intentional and incidental 
memorization (see also Stark & Okado, 2003). In line with these findings, 
we might argue that our results could be generalized to incidental declarative 
learning, especially as we found no evidence for a modulating effect of 
SRPEs on the neural response during word pair encoding. 
Second, although we clearly demonstrated the effect of SRPEs on 
recognition accuracy and certainty ratings, it is unclear whether the results 
would generalize to other tests such as free recall. Previous studies have 
already demonstrated distinct effects on recall and recognition (Ketz, Jensen, 
O’Reilly, & O’Reilly, 2015; Merkow, Burke, Stein, & Kahana, 2014; 
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Wilding & Ranganath, 2011). On a practical note, given the low statistical 
power of many declarative learning paradigms, it is quintessential to choose 
the outcome variable carefully. For instance, we based our paradigm on the 
testing effect (Gates, 1917; Karpicke & Roediger, 2008), which has been 
proven to result in a large memory enhancement. In the original study 
(Karpicke & Roediger, 2008), memory performance increased from 
approximately 35% accuracy to 80% accuracy, an effect size rarely observed 
in psychology. Testing the generalizability of the current findings to more 
stringent memory tests such as free recall, might therefore first require 
increased statistical power. 
Characteristics of the evoked RPEs 
A central question in constructing the current paradigm was how to 
evoke PEs that remained stable throughout the experiment. Indeed, it is hard 
to create a surprising environment that does not become predictable after a 
few trials. For example, pairing the presentation of the word pair with the 
infrequent presence or absence of a concurrent sound might lose its 
effectiveness after a few trials. With the current paradigm we managed to 
create stable RPEs, likely because the predictions remained task relevant 
throughout the experiment. Still, the specific construction of RPEs in the 
current paradigm highlights a number of characteristics that deserve further 
attention.  
First, in the current experiment, positive and negative RPEs of various 
sizes were generated by manipulating the obtained reward and the a priori 
chance of receiving a reward (i.e., by varying the number of response 
options). By doing so, we also needed to control for the separate effect of the 
number of response options and the obtained reward, as well as the 
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interaction between both variables. Especially in the time-frequency 
analysis, the separate effect of the number of options and obtained reward 
was clearly detectable in the oscillatory power estimates during reward 
feedback. Alternative manipulations of the RPEs during declarative learning 
are needed to fully differentiate between the separate effects of the SRPEs, 
the number of trials and the obtained reward found in the current study. 
Second, our results demonstrated that increasingly negative RPEs 
have an increasingly negative effect on declarative learning. That is, memory 
performance was worse in the unrewarded two-option condition compared to 
the unrewarded four-option condition. This effect was significant in the 
behavioral experiment (see page 78) as well as the EEG experiment (see 
page 111). However, this effect should be interpreted with care as 
participants still performed better than chance on the recognition test (chance 
performance located at 25% accuracy). Overall, it would be interesting to 
focus more specifically on the effect of negative RPEs in subsequent studies, 
as also negative outcomes have been shown to elicit dopamine bursts 
(Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, & Hikosaka, 2010), which might reverse the 
currently observed effect. 
Third, in the discussion of chapter 3 we speculate that the testing 
effect is largely driven by the RPEs created during the recall tests. We 
argued that actively engaging in learning by making (reward) predictions 
might also explain why testing, elaborative interrogation and self-
explanation outperform other active learning strategies such as summarizing, 
keyword mnemonics and imagery (Dunlosky, Rawson, Marsh, Nathan, & 
Willingham, 2013). However, it mains to be tested empirically whether the 
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level of agency during prediction and the specificity of the generated 
predictions play a crucial role in whether RPEs enhance declarative learning. 
Lastly, in order to claim that the testing effect is largely driven by 
SRPEs, we need to address the importance of explicit (monetary) feedback. 
To start, the monetary reward was mainly provided to encourage participants 
to actively engage in the decision between the one, two or four Swahili 
options. After all, the participants had no prior knowledge that could guide 
them in their choice, so we gave them an additional incentive for 
deliberating on their guess. However, we don’t assume that a monetary 
incentive is necessary to evoke the SRPEs. More importantly, in the original 
study on the testing effect, no feedback was provided during testing. This 
raises the question whether SRPEs offer a valid explanation for the testing 
effect: How can SRPEs explain the testing effect when no feedback was 
provided during testing? However, research on the functions of the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) indicate that both internal and external feedback 
result in similar teaching signals represented in the dorsal ACC (Holroyd et 
al., 2004). Thus, a similar internal evaluation of the test performance might 
have driven the original testing effect even in the absence of external 
feedback (see also Aarts, Houwer, & Pourtois, 2012; Carpenter, 2009; 
Schouppe et al., 2015). 
The temporal dynamics of the effect of SRPEs on learning 
Considering the temporal dynamics of the reported result, we will first 
consider the importance of a close temporal relation between the reward 
feedback and the presentation of the to-be-encoded items. It remains to be 
tested whether the influence of dopamine bursts on declarative information 
is limited to the stimuli that triggered the dopamine burst, or whether it 
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extends to events in the temporal proximity of the dopamine triggering 
event. Based on their review of the literature, Lisman and colleagues (2011) 
suggest that there is a time window (a penumbra) surrounding the dopamine 
burst and that all stimuli that fall within this penumbra benefit from the 
enhanced LPT. This penumbra is suggested to potentially span several 
minutes for events of large adaptive importance. This emphasis on the 
temporal relation between the reward feedback and the to-be-encoded 
material, may help elucidate why the SRPEs had a more pronounced effect 
on declarative learning in the study reported in chapter 3 compared to the 
study reported in chapter 4. Indeed, whereas the reward feedback and the to-
be-remembered word pairs were presented simultaneously in the behavioral 
study (see page 67), we separated the reward feedback from the presentation 
of the correct word pair in the EEG experiment reported in chapter 4 (see 
page 100). By delaying the presentation of the word pair with three seconds, 
we might have reduced the impact of the SRPE on declarative learning. 
Clearly, a follow-up study is needed to further elucidate this point. 
Next, we evaluate our results in light of the temporal dynamics of the 
late LTP hypothesized to implement the effect of SRPEs on declarative 
learning. In line with the neoHebbian learning account, the combined results 
of chapter 3 and 4 indicate that the effect of SRPEs on declarative learning 
was more pronounced after a one-day delay. Importantly, one might wonder 
whether it is odd that we also found a significant effect of SRPEs on 
declarative learning in the immediate test. For example, in their original 
demonstration of the testing effect, Karpicke and Roediger (2008) found that 
participant in the testing and studying condition showed no significant 
difference in their recognition performance at the end of the learning task. 
However, the absence of any difference might have been caused by the way 
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in which recognition performance was measured in this particular study (by 
calculating the accumulated recognition accuracy over multiple tests) and a 
ceiling effect (nearly 100% accumulated accuracy). Also, a number of 
studies have demonstrated that there can be immediate effects on declarative 
learning (Carpenter, 2009; Gruber et al., 2013; Kleberg et al., 2014). 
Finally, the driving effect of RPEs on declarative learning could also 
be used to refine reconsolidation through distributed rehearsal. Each time a 
stimulus is reencountered after some delay, the memory trace becomes 
plastic for a moment, opening a window of opportunity to enhance the 
strength of the memory trace (Lee, 2009; McGaugh, 1966). In line with the 
current results, a number of studies have demonstrated that PEs are needed 
to foster reconsolidation during stimulus rehearsal (Jarome, Ferrara, Kwapis, 
& Helmstetter, 2015; Sevenster, Beckers, & Kindt, 2012). Applying this 
reasoning to the testing effect (Karpicke & Roediger, 2008) might offer a 
more profound explanation of why bulk rehearsal is an inefficient way of 
learning (Dunlosky et al., 2013). That is, during bulk rehearsal the stimulus 
material quickly loses its novelty or surprising value, resulting in 
increasingly small dopamine bursts. Contrastingly, spreading out rehearsal in 
time allows the material to regain its relative novelty and cause larger 
dopamine bursts.  
Dopamine and declarative learning: beyond the RPE account 
Dopaminergic activity is not solely triggered by RPEs. There is a wide 
variety of other sources of dopamine bursts that might be of interest (Lisman 
et al., 2011). First, novelty is another classical trigger of dopamine bursts. In 
addition, novelty can be triggered by a specific stimulus at a specific time, 
but novelty might also be a characteristic of the environment, encompassing 
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a wider variety of stimuli over a longer time. For example, exploring a novel 
environment boosts memory for subsequently presented items, an effect that 
has been ascribed to the tonic increase of dopamine levels induced by the 
exploration (Li, Cullen, Anwyl, & Rowan, 2003). Second, a volatile 
environment in which the reward contingencies change over time has also 
been demonstrated to boost dopamine release and enhance procedural 
learning. Typically, a volatile environment leads to a higher learning rate, as 
demonstrated through modeling and neurophysiological research (Behrens, 
Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007; Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; 
Silvetti et al., 2011). It would be interesting to test whether novelty and 
volatility can likewise be demonstrated to enhance declarative learning.  
Finally, although in the EEG study we try to confirm that SRPEs drive 
declarative learning through the activation of the dopaminergic reward 
system, a causal relation between the proposed neural mechanisms and the 
learning outcome can only be validated through interventional studies. 
Pharmacological interventions (e.g. by administering levodopa) can point 
out whether blocking/boosting the dopaminergic input indeed 
cancels/facilitates the effect of SRPEs on declarative learning. In addition, 
intracranial EEG (iEEG) data recorded in the hippocampal area during 
learning might further our understanding of the impact of SRPEs during 
declarative learning. Similar iEEG studies have demonstrated that 
hippocampal oscillatory activity was predictive for successful memory 
encoding (Fell et al., 2011; Greenberg, Burke, Haque, Kahana, & Zaghloul, 
2015; Haque, Wittig, Damera, Inati, & Zaghloul, 2015; Merkow et al., 2014; 
Sweeney-Reed et al., 2016).  
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CONCLUSION 
The overview presented above demonstrates how the current results 
add to our understanding of the role that PEs play in perception and learning. 
We have demonstrated the usefulness of a formal approach such as the DDM 
to disentangle how prior information influences visual awareness by 
differentiating between its impact on threshold setting and processing 
efficiency. Building upon this paradigm, future research could make a useful 
contribution to the current debate about the influence of prior knowledge and 
experiences on early visual processing. Also, based on combined insights 
from the literature on reinforcement learning and the neoHebbian learning 
framework, we provided the first empirical demonstration for the beneficial 
impact of SRPEs (“better-than-expected” signals) on declarative learning. 
The reliability of our paradigm and findings was validated in a follow-up 
EEG study that provided a full replication of our previous results. In 
addition, a time-frequency analysis on the EEG data confirmed that 
participants indeed experience a SRPE during reward feedback and that 
power modulations during reward feedback were predictive for the 
recognition performance. Thus, our declarative learning paradigm offers a 
dependable tool to further explore the interplay between the dopaminergic 
reward system and declarative learning. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
In dit doctoraatsproefschrift beogen we dieper te onderzoeken hoe 
onze verwachtingen een invloed hebben op perceptie en leren. We 
vertrekken daarbij in hoofdstuk 1 vanuit het predictive coding denkkader 
(Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Summerfield et al., 2006). 
Dit theoretisch kader karakteriseert de hersenen als een voorspellend 
mechanisme dat constant voorspellingen maakt over de nabije toekomst. Het 
maakt daarvoor gebruik van een intern model van de wereld dat toelaat te 
anticiperen op binnenkomende informatie. Het enige wat achteraf nog 
verwerkt moet worden, is de niet-voorspelde input (i.e., de 
voorspellingsfouten). Op die manier stelt het voorspellend systeem de 
hersenen in staat informatie te verwerken op een energiezuinige wijze. In dat 
opzicht spelen voorspellingen en voorspellingsfouten een belangrijke rol bij 
het prioriteren van informatie binnen een breed scala van cognitieve 
processen. 
Dit voorspellend mechanisme heeft twee centrale gevolgtrekkingen 
die we in dit proefschrift verder onderzoeken. Ten eerste spelen de 
voorspellingen die we maken op korte termijn een bepalende rol in hoe we 
de wereld om ons heen percipiëren. We onderzoeken daarbij hoe visuele 
verwerking beïnvloed wordt door deze voorspellingen en de resulterende 
voorspellingsfouten. Ten tweede fungeren voorspellingsfouten als een 
leersignaal zodat we ons intern model van de wereld kunnen optimaliseren 
op lange termijn. Vooral voorspellingsfouten rond beloningsfeedback (i.e., 
reward prediction errors, RPEs; Bush & Mosteller, 1951a, 1951b; Rescorla 
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& Wagner, 1972) spelen een cruciale rol tijdens leren. Hoewel de invloed 
van RPEs op leren reeds uitgebreid onderzocht werd binnen procedureel 
leren is er opmerkelijk weinig empirische evidentie voor een soortgelijke 
invloed op declaratief leren (Squire, 2004). Daarom focussen we in het 
tweede deel van dit proefschrift op het langetermijneffect van RPEs op 
declaratief leren. 
Voor ons onderzoek kozen we bewust een systemische aanpak; 
vandaar de ondertitel van dit proefschrift, a systems approach. We 
vertrekken daarbij telkens van fundamenteel hersenonderzoek naar hoe 
neurale circuits informatie verwerken. Dit laat toe om de mechanismes 
waardoor voorspellingsfouten perceptie en leren beïnvloeden beter te 
begrijpen, met name door gebruik te maken van formele modellen. Deze 
formele modellen laten toe een onderscheid te maken tussen verschillende 
onderliggende processen. Dit kan door de verschillende processen te 
relateren aan unieke parameters die bovendien exact gekwantificeerd kunnen 
worden. 
Hieronder geven we een korte toelichting van ons onderzoek naar het 
kortetermijneffect van voorspellingsfouten op perceptie en het 
langetermijneffect van voorspellingsfouten op leren. We gaan daarbij in op 
de belangrijkste resultaten en bespreken deze in het kader van de formele 
modellen gekoppeld aan elke onderzoeksvraag. 
KORTETERMIJNEFFECT VAN VOORSPELLINGSFOUTEN OP PERCEPTIE 
In eerst instantie richten we ons op perceptie en meer bepaald op de 
rol die voorspellingsfouten op korte termijn spelen binnen visuele 
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gewaarwording. De invloed van voorspellingen op visuele gewaarwording 
gaf reeds aanleiding tot een aanzienlijke onderzoekstraditie en wordt 
eveneens onderbouwd door een aantal theoretische kaders (Enns & Lleras, 
2008; Hohwy, 2012; Rauss, Schwartz, & Pourtois, 2011; Seth, Suzuki, & 
Critchley, 2011; Summerfield et al., 2006). Zo zouden voorspellingen een 
belangrijke rol spelen bij het prioriteren van de input die we bewust 
waarnemen. Er is inderdaad heel wat evidentie die aangeeft dat voorspelde 
stimuli sneller en accurater worden waargenomen (Neely, 1991). Het 
specifieke mechanisme waardoor voorspellingen visuele gewaarwording 
beïnvloeden blijft echter betwist. 
In hoofdstuk 2 gingen we daarom na hoe de waarneming van een 
stimulus beïnvloedt wordt door voorafgaande informatie over de identiteit 
van die stimulus. Proefpersonen kregen de opdracht een stimulus te 
detecteren (i.e., de afbeelding van een huis of een gezicht) voorafgegaan 
door een icoon dat neutraal, congruent, of incongruent was met betrekking 
tot de identiteit van de afbeelding. De identiteit van de afbeelding was echter 
ongerelateerd aan het correcte antwoord, want proefpersonen werden enkel 
gevraagd de locatie van de stimulus te rapporteren (i.e., boven of onder het 
fixatiekruis) en niet de identiteit van de stimulus. Op die manier konden we 
het effect van voorspellingsfouten op visuele gewaarwording testen zonder 
een antwoord-bias te creëren. De resultaten van het experiment geven aan 
dat voorspellingsfouten met betrekking tot de identiteit van de stimulus (i.e., 
incongruente trials) leiden tot een tragere detectie van de stimuluslocatie. De 
voorspellingsfouten hadden echter geen invloed op de accuraatheid waarmee 
de detectietaak werd uitgevoerd. 
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Om de invloed van voorspellingsfouten op perceptie beter te vatten, 
maakten we gebruik van een diffusiemodel ( i.e., het drift diffusion model, 
DDM; Bogacz, 2007; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; 
Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff, 1985). Dit model beschrijft hoe tijdens 
een beslissingsproces (i.e., in dit geval een detectieproces) evidentie voor de 
verschillende antwoordalternatieven accumuleert door de tijd heen. Eens de 
geaccumuleerde evidentie een beslissingsdrempel bereikt (i.e., in dit geval 
een detectiedrempel), wordt het bijhorende antwoord gegeven. 
Voorspellingen kunnen op verschillende manieren het visuele detectieproces 
beïnvloeden. Enerzijds kunnen voorspellingen de accumulatiesnelheid van 
de (on)voorspelde informatie verhogen of verlagen. Anderzijds kan een 
voorspelling beïnvloeden hoeveel evidentie er nodig is voordat een 
beslissingsdrempel wordt bereikt. 
De DDM-analyse wees uit dat voorspellingsfouten perceptie 
beïnvloeden via hun effect op de beslissingsdrempel; deze lag hoger op 
incongruente trials in vergelijking met congruente en neutrale trials. Met 
andere woorden, wanneer er een huis verschijnt terwijl je verwachtte een 
gezicht te zien, is er meer geaccumuleerde evidentie nodig vooraleer de 
afbeelding van het huis gelokaliseerd kan worden. De voorspellende 
informatie had echter geen effect op de snelheid waarmee evidentie in het 
detectieproces accumuleert. 
Met dit experiment brachten we twee stromingen in de literatuur rond 
voorspellingsfouten en visuele gewaarwording voor het eerst samen. 
Voorheen werden diffusiemodellen reeds frequent ingezet in experimenten 
waarbij proefpersonen gevraagd werden de identiteit van een stimulus te 
bepalen (Domenech & Dreher, 2010; Dunovan, Tremel, & Wheeler, 2014; 
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Forstmann, Brown, Dutilh, Neumann, & Wagenmakers, 2010; Mulder, van 
Maanen, & Forstmann, 2014; Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, & 
Forstmann, 2012; Summerfield & de Lange, 2014). Dit identificatieproces is 
echter verschillende van het proces dat in het huidige experiment onderzocht 
werd. We gingen namelijk voor het eerste na hoe voorspellingen de visuele 
gewaarwording beïnvloeden in een detectietaak waarbij het lokaliseren van 
een stimulus centraal staat. Dit onderscheiden individuatieproces (i,e., het 
lokaliseren van een stimulus in de ruimte; Leslie, Xu, Tremoulet, & Scholl, 
1998; Xu, 2009) staat centraal in onderzoek naar visueel bewustzijn (Baars, 
1994; Overgaard & Sandberg, 2012; Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & 
Cleeremans, 2010; Sergent & Dehaene, 2004; Tononi & Koch, 2008). Met 
het huidige experiment bieden we bijgevolg een antwoord op de vraag hoe 
voorspellingen bepalen welke informatie prioritair het bewustzijn bereikt 
(Enns & Lleras, 2008; Hohwy, Roepstorff, & Friston, 2008; Kouider, de 
Gardelle, Sackur, & Dupoux, 2010). Het diffusiemodel biedt bovendien een 
dieper begrip van de processen die deze prioritering sturen en reikt de nodige 
handvaten aan om de neurale basis van dit proces verder te specificeren. 
LANGETERMIJNEFFECT VAN VOORSPELLINGSFOUTEN OP LEREN 
In tweede instantie onderzochten we hoe voorspellingsfouten op lange 
termijn een invloed hebben op leren. Een lange onderzoekstraditie wijst uit 
dat leren voornamelijk gedreven wordt door voorspellingsfouten met 
betrekking tot de mate waarin een ervaring of uitkomst als belonend wordt 
ervaren (i.e., een reward prediction error, RPE). Een ervaring kan meer 
belonend uitdraaien dan verwacht (positieve RPE) of minder belonend dan 
verwacht (negatieve RPE). Deze RPEs worden typisch gekwantificeerd als 
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het verschil tussen de verkregen beloning en de verwachte beloning. Uit 
hersenonderzoek weten we ook dat (positieve) RPEs een invloed hebben op 
leren dankzij hun stimulerend effect op de tijdelijke vrijzetting van 
dopamine die plaatsvindt in de substantia nigra en het ventraal tegmentaal 
gebied (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). 
Hoewel het effect van positieve en negatieve RPEs uitgebreid 
onderzocht is in de literatuur rond procedureel leren (Squire, 2004), is er 
vooralsnog geen empirisch onderzoek naar de impact van RPEs op 
declaratief leren (bij mensen). Er is echter reeds heel wat evidentie uit 
onderzoek op dieren dat uitwijst dat dopamine een heel specifieke rol speelt 
bij consolidatieprocessen in de hippocampus. Zo stelt de neoHebbiaanse 
leertheorie van Lisman, Grace en Duzel (2011) dat een tijdelijke toename 
van dopaminevrijzetting bepaalt welke informatie door de hippocampus zal 
worden vastgelegd in het langetermijngeheugen en welke informatie zal 
worden vergeten. Gezien RPEs voor vergelijkbare toenames in 
dopaminevrijzetting zorgen, voorzagen we dat ook declaratief leren versterkt 
zou worden door RPEs. 
Om dit te onderzoeken ontworpen we een leerparadigma waarin 
proefpersonen Nederlands-Swahili woordparen memoriseerden. Elk 
woordpaar ging tijdens het memoriseren gepaard met een positieve of 
negatieve RPE van gekende grootte. Deze RPEs werden gecreëerd door 
proefpersonen bij elk Nederlands woord eerst te laten gokken tussen een 
aantal Swahili opties. Door in dit keuzeproces per trial het aantal 
beschikbare opties te variëren (i.e., één, twee of vier opties) bepaalden we de 
verwachte kans op beloning. Daarnaast varieerden we ook of de 
proefpersonen positieve of negatieve beloningsfeedback kregen (i.e., een 
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geldelijke beloning of geen beloning). Het verschil tussen de verkregen en 
verwachte beloning biedt een exacte kwantificatie van de RPE die de 
proefpersonen ervoeren tijdens het memoriseren van het correcte 
Nederlands-Swahili woordpaar. Vervolgens testten we het geheugen voor de 
woordparen in een herkenningstest. De proefpersonen werden daarvoor 
opgedeeld in twee groepen waarbij de helft van de proefpersonen de 
herkenningstest meteen uitvoerde en de andere proefpersonen de volgende 
dag terugkwamen voor de herkenningstest. Volgens de neoHebbiaanse 
leertheorie zou het versterkend effect van dopaminevrijzetting op 
consolidatie immers toenemen in de tijd, en daardoor beter waarneembaar 
zijn op een uitgestelde test (e.g., na een dag of een week) dan op een 
onmiddellijke test (e.g., na twintig minuten). 
In hoofdstuk 3 rapporteren we de resultaten van onze eerste studie 
naar het effect van RPEs op declaratief leren. Deze wees uit dat woordparen 
vaker en met grotere zekerheid herkend worden naarmate er toenemend 
positieve RPEs optraden tijdens het leren. Gezien de geheugenperformantie 
toenam naarmate de RPEs toenemend positief werden en afnam naarmate de 
RPEs toenemend negatief werden, interpreteren we de RPEs hier als “beter-
dan-verwacht” leersignalen (i.e., signed reward prediction errors, SRPEs). 
Bij procedureel leren daarentegen wordt leren frequent versterkt door zowel 
grote positieve als grote negatieve RPEs, gekend als “anders-dan-verwacht” 
leersignalen (i.e., unsigned reward prediction errors, URPEs). Zoals 
voorspeld door de neoHebbiaanse leertheorie was het effect van SRPEs op 
declaratief leren groter op de uitgestelde test dan op de onmiddellijke test. 
Bovendien gingen we na of de verbeterde herkenning ook verklaard kon 
worden door toegenomen verwerkingstijd (time-on-task) tijdens het 
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keuzeproces (i.e., kiezen tussen één, twee of vier opties). Dit bleek echter 
niet het geval te zijn. 
Met deze studie leverden we de eerste empirische evidentie voor het 
effect van SRPEs op declaratief leren. De stabiliteit van het effect werd 
bovendien onderlijnd door een interne replicatie: SRPEs voorspelden de 
geheugenperformantie zowel bij de groep proefpersonen die de geheugentest 
onmiddellijk uitvoerde als bij de proefpersonen die de test pas een dag later 
uitvoerden. Het blijft echter de vraag of SRPEs een rechtstreekse invloed 
hebben op declaratief leren (i.e., door de invloed van dopaminevrijzetting op 
consolidatieprocessen in de hippocampus) of leren onrechtstreeks 
beïnvloeden, bijvoorbeeld door toegenomen aandacht na positieve 
beloningsfeedback (Chun, Turk-Browne, Tanaka, & Watanabe, 2007; 
Kruschke, 2001; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Wills, Lavric, Croft, & Hodgson, 
2007).  
Om een dieper inzicht te krijgen in de impact van SRPEs op het 
memoriseren van de woordparen voerden we een vervolgexperiment uit 
waarbij we tijdens het leren de hersenactiviteit registreerden met behulp van 
elektroencefalografie (EEG). Eerst en vooral fungeerde dit experiment als 
een dubbele replicatiestudie, met ook deze keer een aparte groep 
proefpersonen in de onmiddellijke en uitgestelde testconditie. Verder gingen 
we na of proefpersonen tijdens de beloningsfeedback effectief een “beter-
dan-verwacht” leersignaal ervoeren. Om dit na te gaan pasten we een time-
frequency analyse toe op de EEG-data en gingen we na of SRPEs een 
significante voorspeller waren voor de oscillatorische amplitude (i.e., power) 
in verscheidende frequentiebanden. Bovendien gingen we ook na of de 
power tijdens het leren een significante voorspeller was voor de 
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performantie op de herkenningstest. We maakten hierbij een belangrijk 
onderscheid tussen de power tijdens de beloningsfeedback en de power 
tijdens de daaropvolgende memorisatie van het correcte woordpaar. Op die 
manier konden we nagaan of SRPEs een rechtstreeks effect hebben op 
declaratief leren (i.e., powermodulaties tijdens de beloningsfeedback zijn 
voorspellend voor de geheugenperformantie) of een indirect effect hebben 
via toegenomen aandacht tijdens het daaropvolgend memorisatieproces (i.e., 
powermodulaties tijdens de memorisatie zijn voorspellend voor de 
geheugenperformantie). 
In hoofdstuk 4 rapporteren we de resultaten van deze EEG-
vervolgstudie. Eerst en vooral boden de gedragsdata een volledige replicatie 
van de effecten die we in de eerste studie vonden: woordparen worden beter 
en met grotere zekerheid herkend naarmate een toenemend positieve RPE 
optrad tijdens het leren (i.e., “beter-dan-verwacht” leersignalen; SRPEs). Dit 
effect bleek opnieuw sterker te zijn in de uitgestelde test dan in de 
onmiddellijke test. De time-frequency analyse op de EEG data wees 
bovendien uit dat de proefpersonen effectief een SRPE ervoeren tijdens de 
beloningsfeedback aangezien de amplitude van de oscillaties in 
verschillende frequentiebanden significant voorspeld werd door de SRPEs. 
Dit bevestigt dat de kwantificatie van de SRPEs in onze studie overeenkwam 
met hoe proefpersonen de beloningsfeedback ervaren. Daarenboven kon de 
geheugenperformantie enkel significant voorspeld worden op basis van de 
power tijdens de beloningsfeedback en niet door de power tijdens de 
daaropvolgende memorisatiefase. Dit suggereert dat SRPEs een direct effect 
hebben op declaratief leren en biedt geen evidentie voor een indirect effect 
via toegenomen aandacht tijdens memorisatie. 
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Deze twee experimenten bieden de eerste empirische demonstratie van 
het effect van SRPEs op declaratief leren bij mensen. We toonden daarbij 
aan dat onze manipulatie van de SRPEs overeenkwam met de ervaring van 
de proefpersonen. Deze SRPEs bleken ook een zelfde neurale response uit te 
lokken (i.e., gelijkaardige powermodulaties) als typisch waargenomen 
tijdens RPEs in procedureel leren (Cavanagh, Cohen, & Allen, 2009; 
Gehring, Liu, Orr, & Carp, 2012; Luu, Tucker, & Makeig, 2004; Oliveira, 
McDonald, & Goodman, 2007; Yordanova, Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, & 
Kolev, 2004). Uit de resultaten bleek bovendien dat alternatieve processen 
zoals time-on-task tijdens het keuzeproces of toegenomen aandacht tijdens 
de memorisatiefase geen alternatieve verklaring kunnen bieden voor de 
toegenomen geheugenperformantie. Op deze manier biedt dit experiment een 
solide basis om verder te exploreren welke randvoorwaarden gelden bij het 
versterkend effect van SRPEs op declaratief leren. Hoe belangrijk is de 
temporele relatie of het causaal verband tussen de beloningsfeedback en het 
te leren materiaal? Wat is het precieze effect van negatieve RPEs? Gaat het 
versterkend effect van SRPEs op declaratief leren ook op voor andere 
bronnen van toegenomen dopaminevrijzetting zoals nieuwe informatie 
(novelty) of onzekerheid over het beloningsregime (volatility)? Ten slotte 
kan de voorgestelde neurale basis van het effect ook verder onderzocht 
worden door activatie in de hippocampale regio te registreren via 
intracraniale EEG of door de dopaminevrijzetting rechtstreeks te 
manipuleren in een farmacologische interventiestudie. 
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CONCLUSIE 
Samengevat gingen we in het huidige proefschrift na hoe 
voorspellingsfouten een effect hebben op perceptie en leren. Door gebruik te 
maken van formele modellen waren we in staat specifiek na te gaan hoe 
voorspellingen bepalen welke informatie er prioritair verwerkt wordt en op 
welke manier deze prioriteit geïmplementeerd wordt. In de algemene 
discussie gaan we dieper in op de implicaties van onze resultaten voor de 
literatuur rond voorspellingsfouten, visuele gewaarwording en declaratief 
leren. Tot slot, evalueren we hoe onze systemische aanpak toekomstige 
mogelijkheden biedt om een gedetailleerd inzicht te krijgen in de 
prioriterende mechanismes waardoor voorspellingsfouten een impact hebben 
op perceptie en leren. 
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